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The demand and use of renewable energy sources such as solar panels is steadily 
increasing in today’s world.  Renewable energy sources in distribution networks 
effectively reduce the amount of load consumed by customers.  Renewable energy 
sources are also a solution to many environmental concerns.  However, when these 
sources of energy are added to downtown networks they interfere with the normal 
operation of the protective relays and impose challenges such as unexpected tripping of 
network protector relays.  In this paper, the effects of network protector relay operation is 
studied as a function of increasing photovoltaic (PV) penetration within the secondary 
grid network.  Additionally, network protector operation under faulted conditions within 
the primary feeder network or network transformer is investigated.  Finally, a solution is 
proposed to detect abnormal or faulted conditions in the upstream network, and trip the 
associated network protector relay only for these conditions.  The proposed method, 
when applied in the downtown distribution network, prevents the network protector 
relays from erroneously tripping during minimum loading conditions and during high 
























CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The number of photovoltaic (PV) systems present in downtown distribution networks has been 
steadily increasing over the years. These sources of renewable energy effectively reduce the 
apparent load and excess energy flows towards the consumers [11].  These renewable energy 
sources also assist in the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, a major environmental concern 
[3].  Due to their proximity to the point of use, PV systems can reduce or eliminate line losses 
[26]. This ultimately eliminates the need to build new transmission lines and large power plants 
where there is increasing public opposition [3].  PV systems also provide a viable solution to 
improved power quality and reliability, with the potential to reduce total outage times during 
power outages.  Developers are installing PV systems that are able to operate autonomously 
when storms, fires, or other disturbances disrupt the electrical utilities [9] [15].  Additionally, 
during minimum loading conditions such as early in the morning these sources may export 
energy back to the utility grid in a transaction known as net metering. However, these loading 
conditions along with increased levels of PV penetration in downtown distribution networks may 
interfere with the normal operations of the protective devices and impose challenges such as 
unexpected tripping in the network protectors. One example of this issue occurs in the Central 
Business District of New Orleans, where residential, commercial and schools generating their 
own power receive credit for unused power provided by the utility [9].   These areas, however, 
are not allowed to interconnect their generation due to safety and reliability concerns [9].  A 
network protector (NP) relay is a device installed on the low-voltage side of each network 
transformer.  The normal direction of current flow in the downtown network is unidirectional 
from the utility to the customers on the secondary side of the network transformer.  However, the 
direction of current flow will reverse during short circuits on the primary feeder network, or 
when the PV generation within the downtown distribution network exceeds the load demand. 
In the downtown distribution network, multiple feeders supply power to a number of 
transformers which are interconnected together on the secondary side to serve multiple loads. 
When a fault occurs in the upstream network, the network protector disconnects the transformer 
that sees the fault current to isolate it.  Then, the network protector protects the transformer of 
the disconnected circuit by disconnecting the downstream network and isolating the fault in the 
primary feeder or network transformer. A three-phase power directional relay called master relay 
provides this tripping mechanism. The relay monitors the magnitude and direction of the current 
flowing through the network protector when the network protector is closed for the tripping 
mechanism. This relay trips the protector when it senses reverse power flow from the secondary 
grid towards the fault located within the primary feeder network. The network protector 
automatically closes when the voltage on the transformer side of the open network protector is 
higher in magnitude, and is in phase with or leading the voltage on the secondary side of the 
protector after the faulted circuit is repaired and re-energized.  
The network protector is an important protective device in the downtown distribution network 
because it ensures reliable and continuous operation even if one or more feeders are lost due to a 
fault or other abnormal conditions. The presence of renewable sources in the downtown 
distribution network presents a few challenges.  One of the major issues that we are facing today 
is the problem of distinguishing an abnormal or fault condition from excess power flow coming 
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from the secondary grid network.  The network protector senses power flow towards the utility in 
both cases, and trips to prevent the backflow to the primary feeder network.  The network 
protector is designed to reclose for power flow from the utility to the downtown network.  
However, without synchronizing capabilities, it is possible that the network protector may try to 
reclose out of sync on a downtown network that has been islanded [5].  Due to these challenges, 
many utilities that have networks have not been allowing their customers that have PV systems 
(or any generating system) to connect to the grid. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
(NREL) has outlined six cases of utilities successfully implementing PV systems onto their 
system.  These utilities usually implement the interconnection so that the energy produced in the 
downtown network is not fed back towards the grid.  This is accomplished by several methods 
outline below [1]: 
1. Size the PV system lower than the minimum daytime load at the customer meter.  If the 
total demand data for the secondary network can be gathered for a considerable amount of 
time, the amount of PV penetration in the downtown distribution network can be limited 
such that it will always produce less energy than the secondary network consumes at all 
times.  This ensures that the utility is always transmitting power towards the load in the 
secondary network.  
2. Install a minimum import relay (MIR) or a reverse power relay.  The MIR disconnects the 
PV system if the powers flow from the utility drops below a set value.    The reverse power 
relay will disconnect the PV system in the secondary network from the utility if the power 
flow from the utility drops to zero or reverses direction.    
3. Install a dynamically controlled inverter (DCI) to monitor the amount of power coming in 
to the customer location and decrease PV penetration if the load decreases below a specific 
level. The energy flow is monitored at the main feeder and a control signal is sent to the 
inverter which initiates a reduction in generated power, if required. 
4. Allow smaller PV systems to connect to the network which decrease the chances of 
sending power back to the utility. 
All of the methods above, however, limit the amount of energy produced by solar panels in the 
downtown network.  Method 4 places limits on the size of PV systems installed at the customer’s 
site, while methods 2 and 3 control the output as a function of the power flow in the network.  
The minimum load identification (Method 1) method can fail to work if the load becomes lower 
than previously evaluated.   
   The methods mentioned above allow customers to interconnect their PV systems onto the 
grid, at the expense of limiting the available energy in the secondary network.  Other solutions to 
reverse power flow as a result of high PV penetration revolve around implementing changes 
within the downtown network on the customer’s side [4].  Some of these alternatives are listed 
below: 
1. Decrease the network’s series impedance so that it has low voltage drop along its length.  




2. Require customer loads to operate at improved power factor, reducing the need for a higher 
voltage in the primary feeder network. 
3. Require customers with large loads to shed their loads when the voltage in the downtown 
network drops below a certain threshold. 
4. Discretionary loads can be used when the downtown network voltage is high to provide 
additional load for excess power to flow. 
5. Provide a means of energy storage to use up the extra power provided by PV. 
  Since the existing solutions impose limitations on the amount of solar generation present in 
secondary networks, a new method is proposed to prevent the undesired tripping of the network 
protector relay.  A solution is proposed to be able to detect reverse power flow caused by a fault 
condition, and trip the network protector to isolate the fault.  This solution improves the 
efficiency of the PV systems installed in the downtown network by allowing the transformers to 
remain in service for higher levels of PV penetration, and allowing the downtown network to 
provide more power to the local network and the utility system.   
We begin by looking at theory used in load flow studies, including a brief overview of the per-
unit calculations used throughout the study, as well as a review of the Newton-Raphson iterative 
method used to run load flow simulations. Next, we examine the operation of the network 
protector relay by looking at the trip and reclose characteristics.  We also provide a background 
on secondary distribution networks, including spot and secondary grid mesh networks. This 
study will examine different arrangements of distributed generation (DG) located within the 
downtown network to determine if the location of DGs have a major effect on the operation of 
the network protectors and the voltage profile within the network.  We also study the downtown 
distribution network under peak load conditions, and look at the worst case scenario of minimum 
loads with the addition of distributed generation in the downtown distribution network.  Reverse 
power flows in the entire downtown network will be studied as a result of increased PV 
penetration.  The effect of clouds on the operation of network protectors is then studied, as this 
case also has an effect on the voltage stability and available power from the PV systems.  Finally 
this study examines various case studies with different levels of PV penetration present in the 
secondary network, with the occurrence of fault conditions in the feeder network.  We are then 
able to demonstrate the proposed solution that will distinguish a fault from excess PV penetration 











CHAPTER 2. LOAD FLOW ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 Per-Unit System 
Performing circuit analysis with transformers can become tedious due to the different 
voltage levels in systems.  The per-unit method is a system that eliminates the need to 
transform the voltages at every transformer in the system.  In the per unit system the 
currents, voltages, impedances, powers, and other electrical quantities are not measured in 
their usual SI units (amperes, volts, watts, etc.).  Instead, each quantity is measured as 
some decimal fraction of a base level.    Quantities can be expressed in the per unit system 
by the following equations [13]: 
                                                      P.U. volts = volts
base
actual
                                                       (1)                              
                                                     P.U. amps = amps
base
actual
                                                       (2) 
                                                     P.U. ohms = ohms
base
actual
                                                       (3) 
The first step in the per-unit calculation process involves selecting the system kVA which 
is usually chosen based on one of the predominant pieces of equipment or a round number 
such as 10,000 [13].  Next, a voltage base (VLL) is selected which is usually the nominal 
line voltage at that level.  The other base voltages can be determined by the turn-to-turn 
ratios of the transformers in the network.  The base impedance can be calculated for each 
voltage level, and the per-unit values can be determined.  The following equations show 
the relationships between the electrical quantities used in per-unit calculations: 
 










                                                             (4)       








Z                                                           (5) 
                                                      basebasebase IkVkVA  3                                                       (6) 
 
The main advantage of the per-unit system is the fact that the transformers can be 
removed from the calculations since transformer turns ratios are now 1:1.  Once the per-
unit values have been calculated for an entire system, the actual values can then be 





2.2 Power Flow Studies 
 Power flow studies attempt to determine the voltage magnitude and angle as well as the 
real and reactive power flows for each bus in the electrical system under balanced three-phase 
steady state conditions [14].  Typically, the load power consumption at all of the buses and the 
power produced at each generator are provided to run these studies.  These studies determine if 
the system voltages remain within their limits under different loading scenarios, and whether 
equipment such as transformers and lines are overloaded [13].  Figure 2.1 shows the conventions 
used during the power flow studies. 
 
Figure 2.1— Power flow diagram 
 
 The basic calculation process is to solve a non-linear equation that contains: 
 P – the active power into the network 
 Q – the reactive power into the network 
 Vmag – the magnitude of the bus voltage 
 θ – the angle of the bus voltage referred to a common reference 
The definition of the load flow problem involves two of the four parameters listed above at 
each bus, while the other parameters are solved.  For generators (PV buses), P and Vmag are 
usually chosen because the power and voltages are usually controlled via the governor and 
excitation control systems, respectively.  The slack bus is a special generator bus that serves as 
the reference bus for the power system.  The slack bus maintains a fixed voltage, while supplying 
whatever real or reactive power needed to make the power flows in the system balance.   




















The magnitude of the voltage is kept constant by adjusting the synchronous generator 
connected to the bus.  Due to the physical characteristics of generation and load, the terminal 
parameters at each load bus is usually described in terms of its active and reactive powers (PQ 
buses) [13].   
 
2.3 Newton-Raphson Method 
 The Newton-Raphson power flow method was used to determine the voltage magnitudes 
and angles at each bus in the downtown network.  To execute the Newton-Raphson method, all 
data (including line impedances and bus loads) of the equipment within the network must be 
converted to their per unit values on common bases as outlined in section 2.1.  Next, the 
admittance matrix (Ybus) is formed using the following guidelines for admittances connected 
between nodes i and j: 
 
 Add the admittance to the (i,i) position of the the Ybus matrix 
 Add the admittance to the (j,j) position of the the Ybus matrix 
 Add the negative of the admittance to the (i,j) position of the the Ybus matrix 
 Add the negative of the admittance to the (j,i) position of the the Ybus matrix 
 
With this information, the power balance equations are ready to be solved: 
 
     (7) 
     (8) 
where:  
 vi – Voltage at node i 
 vj – Voltage at node j 
 δi – Angle of voltage at node i 
 δj – Angle of voltage at node j 
 γij – Angle between bus i and bus j 
 yij – i,j component of the Ybus matrix 
 PG,i – Real power generated 
 PL,i – Load real power 
 PT,i –Real power transmitted 
 QG,i– Reactive power generated 
 QL,i – Load reactive power 
 QT,i –Reactive power transmitted 
 
 7 
The power balance equations are solved using the following iterative process until the power 
balance equation converges to zero. 
1. Estimate the values of δi and |vi| for the state variables 
2. Use the estimates to calculate Pi,calc & Qi,calc, mismatches, ∆Pi , ∆Qi, and the Jacobian. 
3. Solve the matrix equations for ∆δi  and  correction. 
4. Add the solved corrections in the initial estimates 
a. δi  = δi + ∆δi  
b. |vi| = |vi| + ∆|vi| = |vi| (1+ ) 
5. Use the new values δi  and |vi| as starting values for the next iteration. 
 
2.4 Load Flow Program 
The Newton-Raphson iterative method was utilized via MATLAB to obtain load flow 
solutions throughout this study.  To run the load flow simulations, the actual values provided 
from Entergy had to be converted into per unit values.  We selected an apparent power base of 
1000 KVA and calculated the voltage and impedance bases below: 
 
        (10) 
   (11) 
   (12) 
 
    (13) 
    (14) 
    (15) 
 
   (16) 
    (17) 
    (18) 
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Table 1 below shows the values that were used for the base values throughout the study. 
 
Table 1—Base Values 
  13.2KV Network 408V Network 208 Network 
APPARENT POWER (S) 1000KVA 1000KVA 1000KVA 
VBASE 13.2KV 408V 208V 
ZBASE 174.24  0.043264 0.2304 
 
The modeling data provided from Entergy was converted into bus and line matrixes as input 
for the load flow program.  The bus data consisted of 1,209 nodes/loads with each node 
containing information on: 
 Bus voltage 
 Bus voltage angle 
 Real power generated/consumed at bus 
 Reactive power generated/consumed at bus 
There were 433 secondary grid nodes, 408 feeder network nodes, 215 nodes within the grid 
vaults, 7 nodes for the origination points of each network at the substation, and 152 spot vault 
nodes. 
The line matrix consisted of 1, 412 lines with each line containing information on: 
 Series resistance in each line 
 Series reactance in each line 
 Susceptance in each line 
 Impedance of each transformer 
PV systems that are connected to the electric grid are designed to inject all of the real power 
produced by PV modules into the secondary grid [16].  They control the amount of power 
regardless of the voltage level, so we represented locations of PV penetration as negative 
constant power loads in the simulation [26].  Additionally, standards such as IEEE 1547 and 
UL1741 state that the inverter “shall not actively regulate the voltage at the PCC (Point of 
Common Coupling)” [16] [12].  Therefore, PV systems are designed to operate at unity power 
factor because this condition will produce the most real power and energy.   
Essentially, the PV penetration reduces the amount of real power consumed at the connected bus.  
When more PV penetration is added the bus node can actually generate real power onto the grid.   
It is known that high levels of PV penetration which results in replacing generating units with 
distributed PV systems can limit the amount of available reactive power [12].  The task of 
supplying the reactive power is usually undertaken by the electric utility [11].  This is shown 
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graphically in Figure 2.2 where the grid-connected inverter supplies the real power to the load 
and grid, leaving the utility the task of supplying the required reactive power for the loads. 
 
 
Figure 2.2— Power injected into secondary grid due to PV penetration 
 
When high levels of PV penetration are present, the dynamic performance of the system can 
be affected when reactive power supply is interrupted during a system disturbance, such as a 


















CHAPTER 3. OPERATION OF NETWORK PROTECTOR RELAY 
 
3.1 Operation 
 Currently, Entergy uses network protectors manufactured by Richards manufacturing. 
The Richards 313NP Network Protector that is widely used in the Entergy grids consists of a 
circuit breaker, a motor operated mechanism, and an Electronic Technology Inc. (ETI) 
microprocessor-based network protector relay.  The network protector relay responds to power 
flowing to and from the secondary distribution network.  If a fault occurs in the primary feeder 
network or in a connected transformer, or if the substation feeder breaker is de-energized by 
opening the circuit breaker, the network protector (in sensitive trip mode) will energize the 
network protector’s trip coil to open the network protector.  After the fault clears in the primary 
network, and if the transformer voltage is greater than the secondary voltage, and if the 
transformer voltage angle leads the angle of the network voltage, then the network protector 
relay will energize the reclose output contact and close the protector [2].   
 
3.2 Trip Modes 
 Sensitive Trip – The network protector relay will trip the protector when the net reverse 
power flow exceeds the set point.  Range: -1.0 to -1000.0 mA. 
 Sensitive Trip Delay – The sensitive trip criteria must be met for the duration of the time 
delay period before the network protector will open. Range: 1 to 255 cycles. 
 Insensitive Trip – The protector will not open during normal system conditions.  It will 
open when the “Insensitive Current” set point is exceeded on one of the phases (during a 
fault condition). Range: 0 to 15 amps 
 Watt-Var – The network protector relay will rotate the trip region to ensure that the 
network protector will open under certain conditions. Range: 0 to 15 amps 
 
 
Figure 3.1—Sensitive Trip Characteristic [2] 
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3.3 Reclose Modes 
 Reclose Voltage – Minimum three phase average differential voltage required to close the 
protector. Range: 0.0 to 15.0 volts 
 Reclose Angle – The phase angle between the transformer voltage and the secondary 
network voltage must be greater or equal to this setting. Range: -60 to +30 degrees 
 Reclose Time Delay - Large regenerative loads such as elevators or feeder voltage 
fluctuations can cause momentary reversal of power. In such cases, an erroneous tripping 
may occur and hence time delay is used to delay the reverse power trip function to avoid 
this faulty operation. Time delayed trip restrains the relay from tripping for a user-defined 

















CHAPTER 4. OVERVIEW OF DISTRIBUTION SECONDARY NETWORK SYSTEMS 
 
Secondary networks consisting of spot and network vaults were first developed in the 1920s 
to serve several customers located primarily in downtown areas of major cities [6] [7]. Most spot 
and grid vaults are fed by two to four transformers, each from a different feeder, but a few grid 
vaults are fed from single transformers.  This redundancy increases the reliability of the network, 
allowing loads to remain in service with the loss of one of its sources.  For example, a faulted 
primary feeder or transformer connection to the secondary network is isolated within a few 
cycles and service is continually provided to the load without any interruption [6].  
 
Network transformers and protectors may be located in vaults below the street or sidewalk, 
above the street on pole-supported structures, or throughout high-rise buildings [6].  Figure 4.1 
shows the components of a network unit is located inside the vaults. 
 
Figure 4.1—Network Unit Components [6] 
 
 As shown in Figure 4.1, the primary side of the network transformer is typically delta 
connected, with the secondary connected grounded wye to supply voltage to the grid and spot 
network customers.  The cable limiters (fuses) operate for arcing faults within the vault, and 
help protect the insulation of the secondary cables from excessive heating. 
 
 13 
A spot network is a type of secondary network distribution system that is usually used to 
serve a single customer or multiple customers in a single building such as apartment 
buildings, high-rise office buildings, and hospitals [5].  Figure 4.2 shows an example of a 




Figure 4.2—Example of spot network configuration [6] 
 
Grid networks are designed to serve all network customer loads during peak hours, with an N-1 
or N-2 contingency (1 or 2 network feeders out of service).  The low voltage circuits of the grid 
networks are highly meshed and served by several network units.  This arrangement ensures that 
the secondary load will not be interrupted in case of an issue with the transformer or within the 
primary feeder network.  Grid networks are also referred to as an area network or street network.   
Figure 4.3 shows an example of a typical grid network configuration.   Instantaneous and time-



















CHAPTER 5. MODEL OF DOWNTOWN NETWORK 
 
5.1 Model Parameters 
The network model provided from Entergy consisted of seven 13.2 kV underground feeders 
(referred to as Feeder 1 through Feeder 7), each feeding spot network vaults (277/480V or 
120/208V) and secondary grid vaults (120/208V). Entergy also provided an excel workbook of 
the modeling data that included both primary and secondary nodes along with impedances and 
lengths of line sections.  Information for transformers located in the spot and grid vaults 
included: impedance ratings, primary and secondary connections, and voltage ratios.  A list of 
node locations along with peak levels of all spot and grid network loads was provided. The peak 
load demand for the entire downtown network in this study is 33.6MW.  All seven feeders 
originated from the same substation transformer.  Figure 5.1 below shows all seven feeder 
breakers originating from the main substation. 
 
 
Figure 5.1—Feeder network breakers 
 
 Each feeder breaker feeds a feeder network, where the spot and grid vaults are located.  
Figure 5.2 shows a one line diagram of feeder network 1 with relative locations of spot and grid 
vaults. Feeder networks 2 through 7 have similar arrangements. 
The following node nomenclature was used throughout the study: 
• F1_Node005 = Node 5 on Feeder 1 (13.2kV) 
• Grid_005 = Node 5 on secondary network grid (120/208V) 
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• GV03_Load, GV03_Fdr7, or GV03_Node1 = a node located inside grid vault 
GV_03 
• SV04_Load, SV04_Fdr1, or SV04_Node5 = a node located inside spot vault 
SV_04 












CHAPTER 6. VOLTAGE ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 PV Penetration Only in Grid Mesh Network 
This section is devoted the analysis of the downtown network under peak and minimum 
loading conditions.  We evenly distributed the renewable sources at 24 load nodes throughout the 
grid network.  For the simulations the total peak load was distributed equally among all 24 PV 
sources within the secondary grid.  At this level, the total PV generation within the grid network 
was equal to the total peak load demand (Total PV penetration = 33.6MW).  During the 
simulations, we increased the PV penetration from 5%, to 15%, up to 150% of total peak demand 
to observe the effect of network protector operation and stability with increasing PV penetration.  
The penetration levels are defined as the ratio of the real power output of the PV module to the 
peak load at the node.  For example, if the peak real power consumed at a particular node is 
10kw, 1.5kw of power would be generated at this location with 15% PV penetration present. 
 
                  (19) 
 
 
6.1.1 Voltage Profiles under Different PV Arrangements 
After the model of the downtown network was completed, the renewable sources were 
inserted into the grid network.  These renewable sources essentially reduced the amount of real 
power that was consumed at the loads.  At high levels of generation, these renewable sources 
transmit real power to nearby nodes and other loads.  For our analysis, we studied three different 
arrangements of renewable sources in the grid network.  Next, a comparison was made among all 
three PV arrangements to determine if the location of the PV penetration would have a 
significant effect on our simulations.  Tables 2-5 show the per unit voltages in the grid network 
for 0%, 5%, 15%, and 30% PV penetration using different arrangements.  The voltage profiles of 
all the arrangements at 5%, 15%, and 30% of PV penetration are shown in Figures 6.1-6.3. 
 
Table 2—per unit grid voltages with no PV Penetration in network 
0% PV Penetration Base Case 
Minimum Voltage (pu) 0.916248 
Maximum Voltage (pu) 0.99728 





Figure 6.1—Grid Voltages for all arrangements with 5% PV penetration 
 
Table 3—per unit grid voltages with 5% PV penetration 
5% PV Penetration Arrangement 1 Arrangement 2 Arrangement 3 
Minimum Voltage (pu) 0.918112 0.901363 0.918585 
Maximum Voltage (pu) 0.997398 0.99801 0.99774 
Mean Voltage (pu) 0.977865 0.977427 0.977885 
 
 
Figure 6.2—Grid Voltages for all arrangements with 15% PV penetration 
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Table 4—per unit grid voltages with 15% PV penetration 
15% PV Penetration Arrangement 1 Arrangement 2 Arrangement 3 
Minimum Voltage (pu) 0.921712 0.910074 0.923127 
Maximum Voltage (pu) 1.012061 1.011921 1.007138 
Mean Voltage (pu) 0.981671 0.981145 0.981743 
 
 
Figure 6.3—Grid Voltages for all arrangements with 30% PV penetration 
 
Table 5—per unit grid voltages with 30% PV penetration 
30% PV Penetration Arrangement 1 Arrangement 2 Arrangement 3 
Minimum Voltage (pu) 0.9268 0.921752 0.929644 
Maximum Voltage (pu) 1.036362 1.04793 1.024666 
Mean Voltage (pu) 0.986753 0.986083 0.986922 
 
No major differences were observed with the voltage profiles among the different topologies 
at low levels of PV penetration.  However, at high levels of penetration we observed differences 
with the stability of each arrangement.  For example, under peak loading conditions both 
arrangements 1 and 3 became unstable after 135% PV penetration.  Arrangement 2, however, 
was determined to be less stable at high levels of PV penetration, becoming unstable when PV 
penetration exceeded 90%.  These results are shown in Figure 6.4.  This result provides a 
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framework for ongoing research to examine the optimal placement of PV modules within 
distribution networks.  
 
Figure 6.4—Network protector operations in grid network 
6.1.2 Renewable Sources with Peak Loading 
In this section, the voltage profile of the feeder networks and the grid networks are studied 
under peak loading conditions.  The peak loading information at each bus was provided from 
Entergy.  The PV penetration was increased from 5%, to 15%, to 150% of the total peak load in 
increments of 15%.  This allowed us to study the effect of the renewable sources under peak 
loads throughout the feeder and grid networks.  Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show similar results for 
arrangements 2 and 3 under peak loading conditions. 
 
Figure 6.5—Voltage profile for Arrangement 1 under peak loads 
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Figure 6.5 shows that the voltage within the grid network for arrangement 1 increases as a result 
of more PV penetration within the grid network. Cases where PV penetration equals 5%, 15%, 
and 30% of the peak loads were simulated.   
 
Figure 6.6—Voltage profile for Arrangement 2 under peak loads 
 
 







6.1.3 Renewable Sources with Minimum Loading 
In this section, the voltage profile of the grid network is studied under minimum loading 
conditions.  In this case, the minimum loads were calculated as 16% of the peak loads.  The PV 
penetration was increased from 5%, to 15%, to 150% of the load in increments of 15%.  This 
allowed us to study the effect of the renewable sources under minimum loads throughout the 
feeder and grid networks.  Figure 6.8 shows that the voltage within the grid network for 
arrangement 1 increases as a result of more PV penetration within the grid network.  Cases 
where PV penetration equals 5%, 15%, and 30% of the peak loads were simulated.  Figures 6.9 
and 6.10 show similar results for arrangements 2 and 3 under peak loading conditions. 
 
Figure 6.8— Voltage profile for Arrangement 1 under minimum loads 
 
 




Figure 6.10— Voltage profile for Arrangement 3 under minimum loads 
We see an improvement in the voltage profile for all arrangements at low levels of PV 
penetration. Unless explicitly stated, the remainder of the simulations in this study are performed 
using arrangement 1.   
 
 
6.2 PV Penetration in Grid Mesh & Spot Networks 
Until this point, all distributed generation has been present only within the grid mesh 
network.  In this section, the effect of PV penetration within both the grid mesh and spot 
networks are observed. For our simulations, we inserted PV penetration at 6 locations within the 
spot networks.  At peak load conditions, these locations consumed 3.66MW (10.89% of total 
peak demand).  These loads, however, now generate 5%, 15%, up to 150% (of peak load) of their 
loads.  The remaining PV penetration at each level is distributed equally among the original 24 
grid nodes.  As an example, at 100% PV penetration 3.66MW is generated within the spot 
network.  Within the grid network 29.94MW (33.6MW – 3.66MW = 29.94MW) is generated 
among the 24 grid loads.  This essentially decreases the PV penetration within the grid mesh 
network, with the addition of renewables within the spot networks.   
 
6.2.1 Renewable Sources with Peak Loading 
Figure 6.11 shows the voltage profile of the grid mesh network with PV penetration in the 
grid and spot networks.  At low penetration levels, the distributed generation provides voltage 
support for multiple grid mesh nodes.  However, we begin to see grid voltages above 5% 
nominal rating when the PV penetration exceeds 60%.  Additionally, we begin to see a decline in 





Figure 6.11— Voltage profile with PV penetration in grid mesh & spot network (peak loads) 
 
6.2.2 Renewable Sources with Minimum Loading 
Figure 6.12 shows the voltage profile of the grid mesh network with PV penetration in the 
grid and spot networks.  We see more severe voltage problems in the case of minimum loads.  At 
45% PV penetration, there are locations where voltage levels increased a 5% above of its 
nominal rating.  Additionally, we begin to see a decline in bus voltages when the PV penetration 
levels exceed 105% of the peak loads. This issue can be attributed to the loss of reactive power 
due to the increased PV penetration, which only provides real power. 
 
 
Figure 6.12— Voltage profile with PV penetration in grid mesh & spot network (min. loads) 
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We can take a closer look at some of the grid nodes by observing Figure 6.13.  Figure 6.13 
displays the effect of increased PV penetration on both the voltage and phase at the Grid_154 
node. The voltage at this node is increased from 0.952 p.u. at 0% PV to 0.974 p.u. at 150% PV.  
In this case, the renewable source provides voltage support for this large load (422.9 kVA). 
 
 
Figure 6.13— Grid_154 voltages under minimum loads 
However, there are cases where the addition of renewable sources impacts the network 
negatively.  For a load located at Grid_357, a PV source is also installed, similar to the previous 
case at Grid_154.  In this case, however, we experience high voltages that can cause issues 
within the network.  For example, the PV source causes the bus voltage to increase from 0.99 
p.u. at 0% PV to 1.08 p.u. at 150% PV penetration.  This high level is above the ANSI C84.1 
voltage level (5%).   
 
 




CHAPTER 7. EFFECTS OF NETWORK PROTECTOR OPERATION 
 
7.1 PV Penetration in Grid Network 
In this section we will look at the effects of network protector operation on the grid network 
when PV penetration is initially added only to the grid network in our simulations.  We can 
visualize a scenario during the day where the PV modules are initially off, and then all turned on 
at the same time.  The penetration levels will vary as a function of the available sunlight 
throughout the day.  For these simulations, there are no communications present between the 
network protectors within the grid network.  The sensitive trip setting is set to trip when 1.5% of 
rated transformer current flows from the grid network towards the utility.  Also, reclose 
operations of the network protectors were disabled; so, once the network protector relays trip, the 
transformer will remain open throughout the remainder of the simulation.  In addition to the 
network protector, the transformer protection will disconnect overloaded transformers when the 
loading exceeds 100% of the rated load of the transformer.  Figure 6.1 below shows the amount 
of transformers that will be disconnected when we connect the network protectors in the 
downtown network.  We observed that the simulation did not converge to a solution when the 
penetration levels exceeded 120% and 135% (of the peak loads) for the cases of minimum and 
peak loads respectively.  This indicates that the network becomes unstable at these levels of PV 
penetration due to a loss of reactive power from the utility.    The peak loads used were 
calculated at 100% of the loading information provided from Entergy.  The minimum load was 
calculated as 16% of the peak loads. 
 
 
Figure 7.1— Transformers disconnected under peak and minimum loading 
As expected, we see that with increased PV penetration within the grid network, we will 
experience more reverse power flows.  We see even more reverse power flows in the case of 
minimum loads.  This is consistent with the fact that power will flow towards the feeder network 
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once the load requirement is met at each grid load.  Minimum loads require less power, and will 
therefore cause more power to flow towards the feeder networks than the case of peak loads.   
 
7.1.1 Reverse Power Flows in Distribution Lines (PV Penetration in Grid Network) 
Next, we examine the reverse power flows in the distribution lines as PV penetration is 
increased.  The downtown network consists of 1,412 lines/transformer connections including: 
 169 network protector relays (for each network transformer) 
 717 line connections in the grid mesh network 
 118 line connections in the spot network 
 408 line connections in the primary feeder networks 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 examine the power flows for the lines within the distribution network 
when PV penetration is increased.  Generally, we can expect to see an increase in reverse power 
flows as PV penetration is increased.  It is interesting to note that although the spot networks are 
not generating any real power in this case, line sections within the spot networks experience 
reverse power flows.  Increased penetration within the grid network has an effect on the power 
flows in the spot networks.  In general, PV penetration in the grid network affects the power flow 
in the primary feeder networks, which will alter the power flows within the spot networks as 
well. 
 




Figure 7.3— Reverse power flows with PV penetration in Grid Mesh Network (min. loads) 
 
It is interesting to note that although no PV penetration is present within the spot networks 
for these simulations, we still experience reverse power flows in the spot networks.  Although 
the secondary grid mesh and spot networks are not connected at the loads, their primary 
networks are tied together as shown in Figure 7.4.  In this case, both transformers provide the 
power to the SV27_Load without PV penetration present in the network.  The sources for the 
feeds originate from feeder networks 3 and 5.  However, when PV penetration is added, the 
direction of power flow is reversed at the transformer coming from feeder network 3.  Therefore, 
we see that PV penetration within the grid mesh network can cause reverse power flows, and 
even network protector operations in the spot networks. 
 
Figure 7.4— Power flows for SV_27 with no PV Penetration 
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7.1.2 PV Penetration and Transformer Loading 
Next, we add the effect of transformer overloads to the simulation.  Figure 7.5 shows the 
number of transformers that will be disconnected due to reverse power flows and transformer 
overloads under peak loading conditions using arrangement 1.  We see that we begin to 
experience transformer overloads when the PV penetration in the grid network exceeds 45% of 
the load.  As the PV penetration is increased, more network protectors will experience more 
reverse power flows and trip.  With fewer transformers in the downtown network, the power has 
fewer paths to flow towards the load and can overload the remaining lines and transformers in 
the network.  This process may provoke a cascading event where overcurrent relays operate as a 
result of the increased power flows.  Consequently, the voltage profiles within the secondary grid 
network can be seriously affected and initiate a voltage collapse situation [3]. 
 
 
Figure 7.5— Transformers disconnected under peak loading conditions 
 
7.2 PV Penetration in Grid & Spot Networks 
 
7.2.1 Reverse power flows in distribution lines (PV penetration in grid & spot networks) 
Figures 7.6 and 7.7 details the reverse power flows in all of the lines in the distribution 
network for these simulations. For all cases, we see an increase in reverse power flows as PV 
penetration is increased in both networks.  However, the addition of renewables within the spot 
network provided an increase in voltage stability for the network.  We see that under peak and 















CHAPTER 8. CLOUD EFFECTS 
 
The amount of power that the PV sources deliver is directly proportional to the amount of 
sunlight it receives.  Additionally, the presence of clouds in the downtown network can cause 
voltage fluctuations in short periods of time when a significant amount of energy is provided via 
PV penetration.  This section is devoted to studying these effects on the downtown network.  We 
will consider the cases when 5%, 15%, and 30% PV penetration is present in the downtown 
network.  We performed these simulations with PV arrangement 1.  In all simulations, 6 
transformers are out of service in the network, and one additional transformer is disconnected 
due to the existence of reverse power without PV penetration.  For the simulations, we divided 
the grid network into Areas A, B, and C.  The cloud covers 1/3 of the grid network.  For each 
case, this cloud passes over the network from Area A, to Area B, and finally exiting in Area C.  
With the cloud covering part of the grid network the PV radiation at the renewable sources is 
reduced 70%.    In each case, a “snapshot” of the network is obtained.  We use this information 
to study the voltage profile as a result of the presence of clouds. 
 
8.1 Clouds with 5% PV Penetration 
For the first simulation with the clouds in the downtown network peak loading conditions are 
present with 5% PV penetration.  A total of 1.68MW (5% of total load) of PV penetration is 
added to the grid network.  Three additional network protector relays operate as a result of the 
PV penetration.  With 5% PV penetration present in the downtown network a random cloud 
passes over each area and a “snapshot of the system is obtained.  The renewable sources only 
generate 1.29MW when the cloud is passing through the area. 
 
 (20) 
                   (21) 
 
  Table 6 shows the per-unit calculations for the voltages as the cloud passes through the network 
with 5% PV penetration present. 
 
Table 6— per unit grid voltages with clouds in Areas A, B, & C (5% PV Penetration) 
  No Clouds Clouds in A Clouds in B Clouds in C 
Mean 0.97787198 0.97760624 0.9775441 0.97708528 
Minimum 0.91811449 0.91800278 0.91697057 0.91809696 





Figure 8.1 shows a voltage profile of the grid network with a cloud covering 1/3 of the area. 
 
 
Figure 8.1—Grid Network Voltage with clouds in Areas A, B, & C (5% PV Penetration) 
 
We see that the clouds did not change the voltage profile significantly for the case with 5% 
PV penetration in the downtown network.  Also no additional transformers operated with the 
presence of clouds in the network. 
 
8.2 Clouds with 15% PV Penetration 
The simulation is repeated again for 15% PV penetration.  In this case 5.04MW is added to 
the grid network causing an additional three network protectors to operate. With the presence of 
the cloud, the total PV penetration reduces to 3.86MW. Table 7 shows the per-unit calculations 
for the voltages as the cloud passes through the network with 15% PV penetration present. 
Table 7— per unit grid voltages with clouds in Areas A, B, & C (15% PV Penetration) 
  No Clouds Clouds in A Clouds in B Clouds in C 
Mean 0.9805966 0.97982646 0.97959543 0.97459128 
Minimum 0.9217445 0.92138914 0.9183868 0.92169502 



























































































































































Figure 8.2—Grid Network Voltage with clouds in Areas A, B, & C (15% PV Penetration) 
 
For the case with 15% PV penetration present, we observed a small decrease in the grid 
network voltages with the clouds present.  We also observed one network protector trip with 
clouds present in both Areas A and B.  No transformers became overloaded with the presence of 
the cloud. 
 
8.3 Clouds with 30% PV Penetration 
Next, we observed the passage of a cloud with 30% PV penetration present.  With the cloud 
present, the total PV generated in the downtown network reduces from 10.08MW to 7.73MW.  
Table 8 shows the per-unit calculations for the voltages as the cloud passes through the network 
with 30% PV penetration present.   
Table 8—per unit grid voltages with clouds in Area A, B, & C (30% PV Penetration) 
  No Clouds Clouds in A Clouds in B Clouds in C 
Mean 0.9859777 0.98441874 0.98371357 0.97399468 
Minimum 0.926892 0.92618371 0.92044291 0.92641014 





















































































































































































Figure 8.3—Grid Network Voltage with clouds in Areas A, B, & C (30% PV Penetration) 
 
For the case of PV penetration = 30%, the cloud first arrives in Area A, causing 16 additional 
network protectors to operate.  These transformers remain open throughout the remainder of the 
simulation.  The cloud then passes over Area B, causing 3 more network protectors to operate 
and remain open.  The cloud finally passes over Area C, where no additional network protectors 
operate.  However, Figure 8.3 shows that low voltage will be present in the network based on the 
amount of transformers that are now disconnected at the time.   
Through these simulations, we observed that the effect of the presence of clouds is directly 
proportional to the amount of PV penetration present in the grid network.  For example, we see 
that the voltage of the grid network is impacted as a result of clouds more heavily when the PV 










CHAPTER 9. CASE STUDIES 
 
9.1 Simulations with Faults on Feeder Networks 
In this section, simulations are performed on the downtown network to investigate 
network protector operation under faulted conditions, as well as the operation after a fault.  
These simulations are performed under minimum load conditions where the load is 16% of the 
peak load conditions.  The simulation is summarized below: 
1. Load flow solved at 2%, 5%, and 8% PV penetration for all arrangements. 
2. Three phase fault established on each primary feeder network 
a. Observe additional network protector trips due to fault 
b. Observe re-close conditions post fault 
c. Observe network protectors in open state post fault (due to reverse power flows 
and overloads) 
d. Observe changes (open/closed) in network protectors as a result of fault 
 
9.2 Simulations with No PV Penetration Present 
The first simulation is performed during the evening with no PV penetration present within 
the grid network.  Initially, there are 6 transformers out of service.  An additional transformer is 
disconnected due to reverse power flow.  So at this point we have 162 out of 169 transformers 
connected to the grid network.  Next, a three-phase high resistance (0.05 per unit) fault is 
introduced in each of the primary feeders.  Figure 9.1 shows the location of the fault on feeder 
side of grid vault 2. 
 
Figure 9.1—Simulation results for a fault on feeder network 1 (No PV Penetration) 
Network Protector Status  Feeder 1 
NP out-of-service 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 
NP in open state pre-fault 7 
Additional NP trips due to fault 6 
NP closed after fault 0 
NP in open state post fault 13 
NP in different state after fault 6 
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After the fault has cleared, the voltages on the primary side of the transformer are slightly 
higher than the voltage on the secondary side.  The primary voltage angle also leads the voltage 
angle on the secondary side.  However, due to the small voltage difference between the primary 
and secondary networks (Vd=0.39V), no network protectors reclosed after the fault.   
This same simulation is repeated for each feeder network below in Figures 9.2 through 9.7.   
 
Figure 9.2—Simulation results for a fault on feeder network 2 (No PV Penetration) 
 
Figure 9.3—Simulation results for a fault on feeder network 3 (No PV Penetration) 
 
 
 Network Protector Status  Feeder 2 
NP out-of-service 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 
NP in open state pre-fault 7 
Additional NP trips due to fault 6 
NP closed after fault 0 
NP in open state post fault 13 
NP in different state after fault 6 
 Network Protector Status  Feeder 3 
NP out-of-service 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 
NP in open state pre-fault 7 
Additional NP trips due to fault 4 
NP closed after fault 0 
NP in open state post fault 11 














 Network Protector Status  Feeder 4 
NP out-of-service 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 
NP in open state pre-fault 7 
Additional NP trips due to 
fault 4 
NP closed after fault 0 
NP in open state post fault 11 
NP in different state after 
fault 4 
 Network Protector Status  Feeder 5 
NP out-of-service 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 
NP in open state pre-fault 7 
Additional NP trips due to fault 20 
NP closed after fault 1 
NP in open state post fault 26 








Figure 9.7—Simulation results for a fault on feeder network 7 (No PV Penetration) 
 
9.3 Simulations with 2% PV Penetration Present 
In this section, a three phase high impedance fault is introduced into all feeder networks 
with 2% PV penetration present in the grid.  For arrangement 1in Table 9, 5.9% of the 
transformers in the downtown network are disconnected prior to the fault.  We observe that after 
a fault in feeders 5 and 6 has been cleared, one network protector will reclose in both cases. 
 
 
 Network Protector Status  Feeder 6 
NP out-of-service 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 
NP in open state pre-fault 7 
Additional NP trips due to 
fault 13 
NP closed after fault 1 
NP in open state post fault 19 
NP in different state after 
fault 14 
Network Protector Status Feeder 7 
NP out-of-service 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 
NP in open state pre-fault 7 
Additional NP trips due to 
fault 1 
NP closed after fault 0 
NP in open state post fault 8 




Table 9—Arrangement 1 with 2% PV penetration 
Simulation Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7 
NP disconnected  prior to simulation 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NP trips with 2% PV 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
NP in open state pre-fault 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Additional NP trips due to fault 8 6 4 5 20 16 2 
NP closed after fault 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
NP in open state post fault 18 16 14 15 29 25 12 
NP in different state post fault 8 6 4 5 21 17 2 
 
For arrangement 2, five additional network protectors tripped to remove the reverse power 
flows caused by the 2% PV penetration.  At this stage, 7.1% of the transformers in the downtown 
network were disconnected prior to the fault.  After the fault is cleared, we observe that no 
network protectors reclose. 
 
Table 10—Arrangement 2 with 2% PV penetration 
Simulation Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7 
NP disconnected  prior to simulation 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NP trips with 2% PV 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
NP in open state pre-fault 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Additional NP trips due to fault 7 6 5 17 19 16 2 
NP closed after fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NP in open state post fault 19 18 17 29 31 28 14 
NP in different state post fault 7 6 5 17 19 16 2 
 
For arrangement 3, three additional network protectors tripped to remove the reverse power 
flows caused by the 2% PV penetration.  At this stage, 5.9% of the transformers in the downtown 
network were disconnected prior to the fault.  After the fault is cleared, we observe that no 









Table 11—Arrangement 3 with 2% PV penetration 
Simulation Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7 
NP disconnected  prior to simulation 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NP trips with 2% PV 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
NP in open state pre-fault 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Additional NP trips due to fault 8 6 4 5 20 16 1 
NP closed after fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NP in open state post fault 18 16 14 15 30 26 11 
NP in different state post fault 8 6 4 5 20 16 1 
 
 
9.4 Simulations with 5% PV Penetration Present 
In this section, a three phase high impedance fault is introduced into all feeder networks 
with 5% PV penetration present in the grid.  For arrangement 1, 19 additional network protectors 
trip with after 5% PV penetration has been added to the grid network.  At this stage, 15.4% of the 
transformers in the downtown network were disconnected prior to the fault.  After the fault is 




Table 12—Arrangement 1 with 5% PV penetration 
Simulation Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7 
NP disconnected  prior to simulation 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NP trips with 5% PV 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
NP in open state pre-fault 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Additional NP trips due to fault 8 6 5 4 18 18 3 
NP closed after fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NP in open state post fault 34 32 31 30 44 44 29 
NP in different state post fault 8 6 5 4 18 18 3 
 
For arrangement 2, 22 additional network protectors tripped to remove the reverse power 
flows caused by the 5% PV penetration.  At this stage, 17.2% of the transformers in the 
downtown network were disconnected prior to the fault.  After the fault is cleared, we observe 






Table 13—Arrangement 2 with 5% PV penetration 
Simulation Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7 
NP disconnected  prior to simulation 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NP trips with 5% PV 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
NP in open state pre-fault 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Additional NP trips due to fault 9 7 5 5 16 17 5 
NP closed after fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NP in open state post fault 38 36 34 34 45 46 34 
NP in different state post fault 9 7 5 5 16 17 5 
 
For arrangement 3, 22 additional network protectors tripped to remove the reverse power 
flows caused by the 5% PV penetration.  At this stage, 17.2% of the transformers in the 
downtown network were disconnected prior to the fault.  After the fault is cleared, we observe 
that no network protectors reclose. 
 
Table 14—Arrangement 3 with 5% PV penetration 
Simulation Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7 
NP disconnected  prior to simulation 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NP trips with 5% PV 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
NP in open state pre-fault 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Additional NP trips due to fault 5 6 5 4 18 16 2 
NP closed after fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NP in open state post fault 34 35 34 33 47 45 31 
NP in different state post fault 5 6 5 4 18 16 2 
 
 
9.5 Simulations with 8% PV Penetration Present 
In this section, a three phase high impedance fault is introduced into all feeder networks 
with 8% PV penetration present in the grid.  For arrangement 1, 57 additional network protectors 
trip with after 8% PV penetration has been added to the grid network.  At this stage, 37.9% of the 
transformers in the downtown network were disconnected prior to the fault.  After the fault is 






Table 15—Arrangement 1 with 8% PV penetration 
Simulation Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7 
NP disconnected  prior to simulation 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NP trips with 8% PV 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
NP in open state pre-fault 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Additional NP trips due to fault 6 6 2 2 14 6 5 
NP closed after fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NP in open state post fault 70 70 66 66 78 70 69 
NP in different state post fault 6 6 2 2 14 6 5 
 
For arrangement 2, 56 additional network protectors tripped to remove the reverse power 
flows caused by the 8% PV penetration.  At this stage, 37.3% of the transformers in the 
downtown network were disconnected prior to the fault.  After the fault is cleared, we observe 
that no network protectors reclose. 
 
Table 16—Arrangement 2 with 8% PV penetration 
Simulation Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7 
NP disconnected  prior to simulation 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NP trips with 8% PV 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 
NP in open state pre-fault 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
Additional NP trips due to fault 7 5 3 2 13 11 3 
NP closed after fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NP in open state post fault 70 68 66 65 76 74 66 
NP in different state post fault 7 5 3 2 13 11 3 
 
For arrangement 3, 57 additional network protectors tripped to remove the reverse power 
flows caused by the 8% PV penetration.  At this stage, 37.9% of the transformers in the 
downtown network were disconnected prior to the fault.  After the fault is cleared, we observe 










Table 17—Arrangement 3 with 8% PV penetration 
Simulation Feeder 1 Feeder 2 Feeder 3 Feeder 4 Feeder 5 Feeder 6 Feeder 7 
NP disconnected  prior to simulation 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
NP Trips with no PV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NP trips with 8% PV 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
NP in open state pre-fault 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Additional NP trips due to fault 3 5 2 4 16 14 5 
NP closed after fault 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NP in open state post fault 67 69 66 68 80 78 69 



























CHAPTER 10. RECLOSE VOLTAGE ANALYSIS 
 
10.1 Closing Characteristic of Network Protector Relay 
In this section, the reclosing voltage DV , which is the voltage difference between the two 
sides of the network protector (i.e., transformer side voltage and network side voltage,) is 
observed. The closing characteristic of the network protector relay is shown in Figure 10.1 
below. 
 
Figure 10.1—Closing characteristic of the network protector relay [10] 
The symbols used in Figure 10.1 are summarized below: 
 
VD = VT – VN          (22) 
VT = transformer side voltage        (23) 
VN = network side voltage        (24) 
VD = difference voltage         (25) 
 
Due to the existence of the fault current, the voltage difference in the case of fault is different 
from when the fault has been cleared. The reclosing action takes place only when the voltage on 
the transformer side of the open network protector is slightly higher in magnitude and is in phase 
with or leading the voltage on the network side of the protector. The reclosing action is 
accomplished primarily with two settings on the Richards network protector provided by 
Entergy: 
 Reclose Volts: Minimum three phase average differential voltage necessary to close 
the protector. 
 Reclose Angle: The protector will not close if the angle between the network voltage 
and differential voltage is below this setting.  
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The default setting for the reclose voltage is set at 1.4V with an adjustable range of 0.1 to 
10.0 Volts.  In other words the protector will not close unless the voltage of the transformer side 
of the open network protector is at least 1.4V greater than the voltage on the network side of the 
protector.  The default setting for the reclose angle is set at -5 degrees with an adjustable range of 
-25 to +5 degrees.   
 
 
10.2 Reclose Settings Analysis 
We can look at the reclose analysis of the network protector relay by revisiting the fault 
analysis covered in Section 8.5 of this paper: 
If we look at arrangement 1 with 8% PV penetration present in the grid network we recall 
that 64 out of the 169 transformers are disconnected prior to the fault.  In our simulations, the 
reclose voltage is set at 2V.  However, if we use the default reclose voltage setting of the relay 
the voltage difference, VD, before a fault on feeder 5 has cleared will be seen in Figure 10.2. 
 
 
Figure 10.2—VD before a fault has cleared on feeder 5 
With the reclose voltage set at 1.4 Volts, two network protectors will reclose after the 
fault has cleared.  At GV29_Fdr4, the voltage difference, VD = 1.87V > 1.4V; and at 
GV44_Fdr7, VD = 1.62V > 1.4V.  However, after the fault has cleared both transformers will 
see reverse power and trip again.  After a 6 cycle time delay, both transformers will reclose.  
This process will continue leading to excessive relay operations, known as pumping.  The 
reclose voltage setting establishes the minimum difference voltage magnitude required to 
issue a close command when the difference voltage and network voltage are in phase [10].  
Allowing the network protector to close with a small difference voltage magnitude can lead 
to pumping.  To resolve this issue, minimum reclose voltage was changed to 2V throughout 
simulations.  
 
To illustrate the reclose analysis with the reclose voltage set at 2V, we will revisit the 
fault analysis of arrangement 1 with 2% PV penetration.  In this simulation 20 network 
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protectors were disconnected prior to the fault on feeder 5.  When a fault occurs on feeder 5 
no network protectors reclose, and the voltage difference for the relays resemble Figure 10.3. 
 
Figure 10.3—VD before a fault has cleared on feeder 5 
After the fault has cleared, we see that one network protector recloses and stays closed.  
Figure 10.4 shows plots of the voltage difference after the fault has cleared.  Increasing the 
reclose voltage setting to 2V eliminated the excessive breaker operations that were present when 
this setting was set at the default setting of 1.4V.  We only observed this issue of “pumping” in 
the presence of distributed generation in the secondary grid network. 
 









CHAPTER 11. PV PENETRATION LIMITS 
 
At this stage, it is very difficult to determine a safe minimum amount of generation on the 
Downtown Network Electrical Distribution system with our current knowledge of the downtown 
network. Network protectors operate very rapidly.  Under minimum customer electrical usage 
conditions and when faults occur, network protectors could operate and the local distribution 
system could become unstable. In addition, tripping the network protectors could cause the 
secondary cable system to overload. Since reliability of electrical service is paramount, more 
work and study towards investigation of the downtown network under these incidents are 
required before allowing customer electrical generation to be connected. 
 
To examine the acceptable PV penetration limits on the grid network, we studied the grid 
network under minimum loading conditions.  This gives us a worst case scenario where the 
generation within the grid network exceeds the load demand much sooner in simulations.  In 
these simulations the sensitive trip setting is set to trip when 1.5% of rated current flows from the 
grid network to the feeder network.  No communications between network protectors were 
present during the simulation.  The reclose operation of the protector was disabled throughout 
the simulations.  In addition to the network protector protection, the transformer will disconnect 
overloads at 100% of rated loads. 
 
 
11.1 Simulations with 8% PV Penetration Present 
The effect of the network protectors under minimum loading conditions with 8% PV 
penetration is outlined below: 
 
 6 out of 169 transformers out  of service prior to simulations 
 1 additional transformer is disconnected due to reverse power flow with no PV 
penetration 
 8% PV penetration inserted into grid network 
o 33 transformers initially trip due to reverse power flow 
o After 6 cycles, 10 transformers trip due to reverse power flow 
o After another 6 cycles, 6 transformers trip due to reverse power flow 
o After another 6 cycles, 4 transformers trip due to reverse power flow 
o 1 transformer becomes overloaded, and is disconnected from the grid network 
o After another 6 cycles, 1 transformers trip due to reverse power flow 
o 62 out of 169 transformers are disconnected (37% removed) 
 
 
Since this project only concentrates on the network protector operation, we suggest that another 
investigation be carried out to observe the downtown network load-flow and transients under 





CHAPTER 12. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
The experimental results obtained above clarifies that the network protector can sense some 
reverse power flow when distributed solar generation exists in the secondary network even when 
there is no fault in the primary feeder.  This situation can cause the network protectors to falsely 
trip due to distributed generation from the secondary grid. Hence, this section is dedicated to 
proposing a solution that could potentially prevent the erroneous tripping of network protectors 
because of the reverse current produced by the presence of PV penetration within the grid 
network. 
The proposed method requires obtaining all currents, injected and absorbed, by the network 
protectors and loads on the feeder. This requires a data acquisition system using hard-wire 
connections or a data transmission infrastructure. The measured currents provide a signal that 
can override the trip command of all the network protectors inside the feeder. For proper 
operation, the proposed method must be applied to all the individual feeders, simultaneously.  
The following algorithm can be used to detect faults located in the primary feeder network 
and trip the network protector to isolate the fault.  For reverse current flow as a result of excess 
PV penetration, the network protector will still sense the reverse power; however, a block 
command will prevent the protector from tripping. 
o For each feeder network, N (where N = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), measure the current flow at the 
origination point at the substation using current transformers. 
o IN = current originating from substation in feeder network N 
o When IN > 0 current is flowing from the main substation towards the 
feeder network. 
o When IN < 0 current is flowing from the feeder network towards the main 
substation.  This happens at high levels of PV penetration within the 
secondary grid network, where the excess power will flow back to the 
main transformer.  A fault on the main substation transformer can also 
cause power to flow to the main substation. 
o Using current transformers, measure the current associated with feeder network N at each 
spot and grid vault. 
o Igrid_n = current at GV_0n 
o Ispot_n = current at SV_0n 
o In unfaulted case: 
o IN = ∑ (Igrid_n + Ispot_n) 
o For a fault in feeder network N: 
o IN ≠ ∑ (Igrid_n + Ispot_n) 
o This feature will override a trip condition on the network protector 
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o If the NP senses reverse power flow AND IN ≠ ∑ (Igrid_n + Ispot_n) the network 
protector will issue a trip command. Otherwise reverse power flow is due to PV 
penetration and no trip command is issued. 
 
 
Figure 12.1—Logic diagram of fault detection system 
 
Figure 12.1 is a simple logic diagram for the proposed solution.  The network protector will 
only trip if the network protector relay senses reverse power flow above the sensitive trip setting 
and if the real power flows originating from the main substation in feeder network N does not 
equal the real power flows associated with feeder network N at each spot and grid vault.  The 
network protector also has a time delay set at a speed slower than the speed of the central control 
system.  This allows the central control system time to process the algorithm and determine if the 
power flow in the feeder network N sums to zero.  This scheme also requires communication 
between each network protector and the central control system. 
 
12.1 Feeder 1 Simulations with 5% PV Penetration 
To demonstrate the algorithm we will look at the feeder network 1 in Figure 12.2.  Current 
transformers are shown on the 13.2KV primary side of the spot and grid vaults, as well as on the 
13.2KV feeder breaker.  These currents are combined together to detect faults on the 13.2KV 
feeder network.  In this simulation, 5% PV penetration under minimum loads (16% of peak load) 
is present.  With 5% PV penetration present within the grid network, 12 transformers will sense 
real power flowing from the secondary network to the feeder network.   
 
After running the load flow simulation with these conditions, we observed that one of the 
network protectors from feeder network 1 will sense reverse power flow.  However, the sum of 
the currents flowing in feeder network 1 approximates to zero which indicates that there is no 
fault in the feeder network.  Therefore, we do not want any network protectors to trip for this 
condition.  The central control system will calculate the following parameters from the current 
and voltage transformers connected to each of the vaults.  These calculations shown are the per 




o I1 = 0.5062262 – j1.7302874 
o ∑ Igrid_n = 0.1911643 – j0.8945817 
o ∑ Ispot_n = 0.3150619 – j0.8357057 
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n  = 0.5062225 – j1.730286 
The power flows within feeder network 1 with 5% PV penetration are also shown below. 
o P1 = 515.39 kW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n = 198.67 kW 
o ∑ Pspot_n = 316.09 kW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n  = 514.76 kW 
The positive real part of I1 indicates that current flows from the main substation towards 
the feeder 1 network.  The summation of the current contributions from the grid and spot vault 
only differs slightly from the main current, I1, which can be attributed to the line losses in the 
distribution lines.  Based on these calculations, the central control system will send a block 
signal to the associated network protector relays, preventing these relays from tripping. 
 
12.1.1 5% PV Penetration without Fault 
 






12.1.2 5% PV Penetration with Fault 
The case for the fault on feeder network 1 is shown in Figure 12.3.  A three phase fault 
occurs on feeder network 1.  For this case, 8 network protectors in feeder network 1 will sense 
the reverse power flowing from the grid network to the feeder network.  In this case, we want the 
network protectors to trip in order to isolate the fault on the feeder network.  The central control 
system detects this as a fault using the calculations below: 
 
o I1 = 19.6404299 – j1.4770175 
o ∑ Igrid_n = -0.1810792 – j0.6645902 
o ∑ Ispot_n = -0.0226011 – j0.6298474 
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n  = -0.2036804 – j1.2944375 
 
The power flows within feeder network 1 with 5% PV penetration and a fault present in the 
primary feeder network are also shown below. 
 
o P1 = 19,640 kW = 19.64 MW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -179.68 kW 
o ∑ Pspot_n = -21.55 kW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n  = -201.22 kW 
 
We see that there is a large mismatch between the current flowing from feeder 1 (I1) of 
the main substation and the current flowing through the vaults (Igrid and Ispot) that are connected 
to the feeder 1 network.  Additionally, the current flowing from the main transformer is of a 
much higher magnitude than normal which indicates that this is possibly a large source of fault 
current to the fault on feeder 1.  This fault also causes a number of network protectors to sense 
the reverse current.  As a result, all 8 network protectors will trip to isolate this fault on the 
faulted feeder.  Figure 12.3 also shows the network protectors which will trip due to the fault 
condition within feeder network 1.  The arrows indicate the direction of current flow measured at 
the main substation feeder, as well as at each of the grid and spot vaults in the network using 
current transformers.  In Figure 12.3 current flows from the main substation feeder to the 
primary feeder.  In the case of the grid and spot vaults, the currents flowing towards the primary 





Figure 12.3—Feeder network 1 with fault (5% PV penetration) 
 












Table 18 shows the current values (in per unit) which were used to calculate the parameters for 
the fault detection scheme. Reverse power flows at each network transformer are highlighted. 
 
Table 18—Current calculations for simulation with 5% PV penetration 
From Node  To Node Current (pu) without fault Current (pu) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_1 0.506-1.73i 19.64-1.477i 
F1_Node006 SV01_Fdr1 -0.001-0.005i -0.089+0.058i 
F1_Node008 GV02_Fdr1 0.015-0.046i -0.126+0.064i 
F1_Node010 SV02_Fdr1 0.071-0.185i -0.116-0.059i 
F1_Node012 GV03_Fdr1 0.014-0.07i -0.089-0.005i 
F1_Node013 GV01_Fdr1 0.007-0.101i -0.048-0.064i 
F1_Node017 GV04_Fdr1 0.007-0.129i -0.006-0.124i 
F1_Node019 GV05_Fdr1 0.008-0.032i -0.005-0.027i 
F1_Node022 GV06_Fdr1 0.01-0.034i -0.03i 
F1_Node027 GV07_Fdr1 0.01-0.023i 0.009-0.023i 
F1_Node028 SV03_Fdr1 0.02-0.07i 0.015-0.069i 
F1_Node030 SV04_Fdr1 0.046-0.112i 0.039-0.11i 
F1_Node033 GV08_Fdr1 0 0 
F1_Node034 GV09_Fdr1 0 0 
F1_Node035 GV10_Fdr1 0.048-0.156i 0.047-0.156i 
F1_Node038 SV05_Fdr1 0.028-0.086i 0.015-0.082i 
F1_Node041 SV06_Fdr1 0.051-0.106i 0.042-0.103i 
F1_Node042 SV07_Fdr1 0.051-0.13i 0.04-0.127i 
F1_Node045 GV11_Fdr1 0.008-0.06i 0.006-0.06i 
F1_Node046 GV20_Fdr1 -0.011i -0.004-0.012i 
F1_Node050 GV12_Fdr1 0.009-0.02i 0.002-0.018i 
F1_Node053 GV49_Fdr1 0.033-0.143i 0.021-0.14i 
F1_Node055 SV10_Fdr1 0.024-0.081i 0.016-0.079i 
F1_Node057 SV11_Fdr1 0.024-0.061i 0.016-0.059i 
F1_Node058 GV13_Fdr1 0.021-0.07i 0.014-0.068i 
Current  from vaults   0.506-1.73i -0.204-1.294i 
 
 
At 5% PV penetration with a fault in feeder network 1, we see that 8 network protector relays 
will trip to isolate the fault in the primary feeder network.  Only1 additional network protector 
relay sensed reverse power flow from the secondary network for the case without a fault.  
However the current contribution from the main substation feeder was equal to the sum of 
currents at the spot and grid vaults, which indicated there was no fault and consequently, no 
voltage drop in the primary feeder network. Table 19 shows the power flows for the same case. 
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Table 19—Power flows for simulation with 5% PV penetration 
From Node  To Node Real power flow (kW) without fault Real power flow (kW) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_1 515.39 19,640.43 
F1_Node006 SV01_Fdr1 -1.2600797857 -88.9003490922 
F1_Node008 GV02_Fdr1 15.0501748693 -125.8703204335 
F1_Node010 SV02_Fdr1 71.2778595240 -115.2393951813 
F1_Node012 GV03_Fdr1 14.5700433683 -88.8020109445 
F1_Node013 GV01_Fdr1 7.7923436445 -47.9385751271 
F1_Node017 GV04_Fdr1 14.6235395479 -5.8822720928 
F1_Node019 GV05_Fdr1 10.4061499329 -5.2294614834 
F1_Node022 GV06_Fdr1 11.5638748319 0.0375443052 
F1_Node027 GV07_Fdr1 9.9435702518 9.0687880765 
F1_Node028 SV03_Fdr1 22.3063661387 14.8842323241 
F1_Node030 SV04_Fdr1 46.6977834905 39.3862514709 
F1_Node033 GV08_Fdr1 -5.4190367188 0.0000000013 
F1_Node034 GV09_Fdr1 -2.8531317101 0.0000000052 
F1_Node035 GV10_Fdr1 48.5781766184 46.7641366931 
F1_Node038 SV05_Fdr1 28.8400223259 14.8059854823 
F1_Node041 SV06_Fdr1 50.3437249547 41.8543417745 
F1_Node042 SV07_Fdr1 52.8208358439 40.2843884261 
F1_Node045 GV11_Fdr1 8.4453844450 5.7119788200 
F1_Node046 GV20_Fdr1 1.3000516839 -4.3980195567 
F1_Node050 GV12_Fdr1 7.5915989686 2.1156244272 
F1_Node053 GV49_Fdr1 35.8412507757 20.7304434839 
F1_Node055 SV10_Fdr1 23.8714906139 15.5002465854 
F1_Node057 SV11_Fdr1 21.1941836088 15.8780413085 
F1_Node058 GV13_Fdr1 21.2316173169 14.0136205886 




12.1.3 30% PV Penetration without Fault 
Next, we simulate a condition without a fault on feeder network 1 with 30% PV 
penetration present under minimum loads.  Figure 12.4 shows the direction of real power flow in 
the feeder network under these conditions.  At 30% PV penetration we see reverse power flow at 
the main substation feeder.  This is expected as the excess renewable energy is now fed back 












The central control system will calculate the following parameters from the current and voltage 
transformers connected to each of the vaults: 
 
 
o I1 = -0.6297444 – j1.7620101 
o ∑ Igrid_n = -0.8492566 – j0.9672971 
o ∑ Ispot_n = 0.2195132 – j0.7947125 





o P1 = -629.75 kW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -849.36 kW 
o ∑ Pspot_n = 218.96 kW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n  = -630.4 kW 
 
For this calculation, all currents within the network did sum to zero.  Therefore, the 
central control system will issue a block trip to all 16 network protectors associated with the 
feeder 1 network.  This will allow the distributed generation (at 30% of peak load) from the 
secondary network to safely transmit power to the utility grid. 
 
 
12.1.4 30% PV Penetration with Fault 
The case for the fault on feeder network 1 with 30% PV penetration is shown in Figure 12.5.  
A three phase fault occurs on feeder network 1 as shown in Figure 12.5.  For this case, 18 
network protectors in feeder network 1 will sense the reverse power flowing from the grid 
network to the feeder network.  In this case, we want the network protectors to trip in order to 
isolate the fault on the feeder network.  The central control system detects this as a fault using 
the calculations below: 
o I1 = 18.4853699 – j1.5018959 
o ∑ Igrid_n = -1.2434276 – j0.7313455 
o ∑ Ispot_n = -0.1167292 – j0.5898624 
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n  = -1.3601568 - j1.3212079 
 
o P1 = 18,485 kW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -1,240 kW 
o ∑ Pspot_n = -115.85 kW  
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n  = -1,357 kW 
For the case with the fault on feeder 1, the sum of currents in feeder 1 network did not sum to 
zero.  Therefore, we know that a true fault exists on the feeder 1 network and the central control 
system will allow these 18 network protectors to trip to isolate the fault.   
 
Table 20 shows the current values (in per unit) which were used to calculate the parameters 
for the fault detection scheme. Reverse power flows at each network transformer are highlighted 





Figure 12.5—Feeder network 1 with fault (30% PV) 
 
We see the 16 network protectors which will sense reverse power from the secondary 
network.  However, for the case without the fault in the primary feeder network 1 the current 
contribution from the main substation feeder equals the sum of all of the currents in the grid and 
spot vaults.  This indicates that the current that enters the primary feeder network will also exit 
the primary feeder network, with the exception of line losses.  There are no loads located within 
the primary feeder network, so we would only expect small amounts of voltage drops in the 
distribution lines. Therefore, for this case the central control system issues a block signal to all 







Table 20—Current calculations for simulation with 30% PV penetration 
From Node  To Node Current (pu) without fault Current (pu) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_1 -0.63-1.762i 18.485-1.502i 
F1_Node006 SV01_Fdr1 -0.006-0.003i -0.095+0.06i 
F1_Node008 GV02_Fdr1 -0.021-0.049i -0.162+0.062i 
F1_Node010 SV02_Fdr1 0.058-0.178i -0.13-0.052i 
F1_Node012 GV03_Fdr1 -0.038-0.067i -0.141-0.001i 
F1_Node013 GV01_Fdr1 -0.157-0.092i -0.213-0.055i 
F1_Node017 GV04_Fdr1 -0.107-0.098i -0.123-0.092i 
F1_Node019 GV05_Fdr1 -0.011-0.029i -0.025-0.024i 
F1_Node022 GV06_Fdr1 -0.031-0.037i -0.041-0.034i 
F1_Node027 GV07_Fdr1 0.003-0.023i 0.002-0.023i 
F1_Node028 SV03_Fdr1 0.017-0.064i 0.011-0.063i 
F1_Node030 SV04_Fdr1 0.04-0.11i 0.033-0.108i 
F1_Node033 GV08_Fdr1 -0.098-0.03i -0.105-0.028i 
F1_Node034 GV09_Fdr1 -0.196-0.108i -0.208-0.105i 
F1_Node035 GV10_Fdr1 -0.062-0.159i -0.064-0.16i 
F1_Node038 SV05_Fdr1 0.012-0.08i -0.001-0.075i 
F1_Node041 SV06_Fdr1 0.048-0.108i 0.039-0.105i 
F1_Node042 SV07_Fdr1 0.046-0.124i 0.035-0.121i 
F1_Node045 GV11_Fdr1 -0.094-0.063i -0.097-0.063i 
F1_Node046 GV20_Fdr1 -0.01-0.009i -0.014-0.01i 
F1_Node050 GV12_Fdr1 -0.009-0.022i -0.016-0.02i 
F1_Node053 GV49_Fdr1 -0.006-0.114i -0.017-0.111i 
F1_Node055 SV10_Fdr1 -0.002-0.074i -0.01-0.072i 
F1_Node057 SV11_Fdr1 0.008-0.054i -0.053i 
F1_Node058 GV13_Fdr1 -0.012-0.068i -0.019-0.066i 
Current  from vaults   -0.622-1.76i -1.361-1.319i 
 
 
We see a similar amount of network protectors which will sense reverse power flows in 
the case of a fault in feeder network 1.  However, the algorithm developed clearly shows a 
mismatch between the power flow that enters and exits the primary feeder network.  In this case, 
the central control system will allow all 18 network protectors relays to operate to isolate the 
fault.  Table 21 shows the power flows which can be calculated using current transformers for 







Table 21—Power flows for simulation with 30% PV penetration 
From Node  To Node Real power flow (kW) without fault Real power flow (kW) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_1 -629.75 18,485.37 
F1_Node006 SV01_Fdr1 -6.23609948 -94.4794342 
F1_Node008 GV02_Fdr1 -21.12221481 -161.6464914 
F1_Node010 SV02_Fdr1 57.48784276 -128.7126627 
F1_Node012 GV03_Fdr1 -38.44512417 -140.7156843 
F1_Node013 GV01_Fdr1 -157.2290522 -212.4579764 
F1_Node017 GV04_Fdr1 -106.7929891 -122.6756897 
F1_Node019 GV05_Fdr1 -11.23322198 -25.19059554 
F1_Node022 GV06_Fdr1 -30.97934784 -40.74889626 
F1_Node027 GV07_Fdr1 2.867885958 2.066855909 
F1_Node028 SV03_Fdr1 16.45468298 11.13455224 
F1_Node030 SV04_Fdr1 39.52575411 33.18110094 
F1_Node033 GV08_Fdr1 -97.47851483 -104.5261543 
F1_Node034 GV09_Fdr1 -196.1349424 -208.2583669 
F1_Node035 GV10_Fdr1 -62.45680283 -64.05582001 
F1_Node038 SV05_Fdr1 12.35527969 -0.758611033 
F1_Node041 SV06_Fdr1 47.48546292 38.5209141 
F1_Node042 SV07_Fdr1 45.83909505 34.99907356 
F1_Node045 GV11_Fdr1 -93.97877251 -96.56936756 
F1_Node046 GV20_Fdr1 -9.694551948 -14.24267043 
F1_Node050 GV12_Fdr1 -9.279195074 -15.5579937 
F1_Node053 GV49_Fdr1 -5.592892092 -17.39857721 
F1_Node055 SV10_Fdr1 -2.090952318 -9.987280658 
F1_Node057 SV11_Fdr1 8.137355686 0.250251732 
F1_Node058 GV13_Fdr1 -11.81224456 -18.8049518 
Power flow  from vaults   -630.403559 -1356.634476 
 
 
Without the fault detection scheme in use with 16% loading and 30% PV penetration, the 
following scenario would have occurred: 
 6 transformers are out of service on this day. 
 An additional network protector trips due to reverse power flow with no PV penetration 
in grid network. 
 30% PV penetration is inserted in grid network 
 79 network protector relays trip due to reverse power flow. 
 After 6 cycles, 24 additional network protectors trip. 
 
 60 
 At this point, the voltage collapses due to the amount of transformers disconnected from 
the downtown network (110/169 disconnected).  
 Only 35% of transformers in service. 
Therefore, the fault detection scheme solves the problem of distinguishing PV penetration 
from a faulted condition by tripping the relay for fault conditions and preventing the relays from 
tripping for the case of PV penetration.  This solution also allows a higher amount of PV 
penetration to be present within the secondary grid network without causing a voltage collapse or 
unstable condition on the power system.  Due to the symmetrical rating of distribution 
transformers, we also know that the thermal limit of the transformer does not vary depending on 
the direction of power flow [8].  Appendix A provides calculations for a fault in feeder network 1 
with 60% and 90% PV penetration.  Additionally, simulation results for faults on the other feeder 

























CHAPTER 13. CONCLUSION 
 
This project has investigated some of the problems and challenges posed by the potential 
addition of renewable energy sources present in downtown networks.  Actual data was gathered 
and used to model these renewable energy sources.  With these models, we were able to study 
the effect of higher distributed generation levels in downtown networks under various loading 
conditions.  As expected, we have shown that our load demand in the downtown network 
decreases with increased PV penetration.  We have also studied the effect of network protectors 
on the downtown network as PV penetration is increased within the grid network.  The effect of 
clouds passing over the downtown network was also studied.  It has been shown that the 
presence of clouds will negatively affect the stability of networks which depend largely on 
distributed generation for energy.  The operation of the network protector relay after a fault 
condition has cleared was also examined.  We were able to eliminate excessive breaker 
operations by increasing the reclose voltage setting on the network protector relay.  Various 
simulations were conducted to examine the operation of the network protectors when the primary 
feeder network was subjected to faults.  Using the results from these simulations, we were 
ultimately able to propose a solution that will only trip the network protectors for faults within 
the primary feeder network.  Potential future studies involve investigating the downtown 
distribution network under more scenarios to determine a safe level of PV penetration.  Other 
future work includes implementing the proposed solution via communication among network 



















APPENDIX A – CASE STUDIES FOR 60% AND 90% PV PENETRATION 
 
A1. Calculations with 60% PV Penetration 
 
A1.1 60% PV Penetration without Fault 
o I1 = -1.9561132 - j1.9128399 
o ∑ Igrid_n = -2.0592297-j1.1482305 
o ∑ Ispot_n = 0.1031161-j0.7646077 
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n  = -1.9561136-j1.9128382 
 
o P1 = -1,956.11 kW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -2,059.74 kW 
o ∑ Pspot_n = 102.31.96 kW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n  = -1,957.43 kW 
 
 
A1.2 60% PV Penetration with Fault 
o I1 = 17.1599451 - j1.6498785 
o ∑ Igrid_n = -2.4538551-j0.9117961 
o ∑ Ispot_n = -0.2331864-j0.5597579 
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n  = -2.6870416-j1.4715539 
 
o P1 = -17,159.95 kW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -2,450.15 kW 
o ∑ Pspot_n = 232.50 kW 









Table A.1—Current calculations for simulation with 60% PV penetration 
From Node  To Node Current (pu) without fault Current (pu) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_1 -1.956-1.913i 17.16-1.65i 
F1_Node006 SV01_Fdr1 -0.012-0.001i -0.101+0.062i 
F1_Node008 GV02_Fdr1 -0.064-0.055i -0.205+0.055i 
F1_Node010 SV02_Fdr1 0.041-0.173i -0.146-0.047i 
F1_Node012 GV03_Fdr1 -0.101-0.07i -0.204-0.005i 
F1_Node013 GV01_Fdr1 -0.354-0.093i -0.41-0.055i 
F1_Node017 GV04_Fdr1 -0.25-0.119i -0.266-0.113i 
F1_Node019 GV05_Fdr1 -0.036-0.035i -0.05-0.03i 
F1_Node022 GV06_Fdr1 -0.079-0.049i -0.089-0.046i 
F1_Node027 GV07_Fdr1 -0.005-0.025i -0.006-0.026i 
F1_Node028 SV03_Fdr1 0.01-0.062i 0.004-0.061i 
F1_Node030 SV04_Fdr1 0.031-0.109i 0.025-0.107i 
F1_Node033 GV08_Fdr1 -0.203-0.044i -0.211-0.042i 
F1_Node034 GV09_Fdr1 -0.406-0.19i -0.418-0.187i 
F1_Node035 GV10_Fdr1 -0.191-0.175i -0.193-0.176i 
F1_Node038 SV05_Fdr1 -0.007-0.075i -0.02-0.071i 
F1_Node041 SV06_Fdr1 0.044-0.108i 0.035-0.105i 
F1_Node042 SV07_Fdr1 0.038-0.122i 0.027-0.118i 
F1_Node045 GV11_Fdr1 -0.214-0.075i -0.216-0.076i 
F1_Node046 GV20_Fdr1 -0.023-0.01i -0.027-0.011i 
F1_Node050 GV12_Fdr1 -0.029-0.023i -0.035-0.022i 
F1_Node053 GV49_Fdr1 -0.054-0.114i -0.066-0.112i 
F1_Node055 SV10_Fdr1 -0.033-0.07i -0.041-0.068i 
F1_Node057 SV11_Fdr1 -0.008-0.045i -0.016-0.044i 
F1_Node058 GV13_Fdr1 -0.051-0.068i -0.058-0.067i 












Table A.2—Power flows for simulation with 60% PV penetration 
From Node  To Node Real power flow (kW) without fault Real power flow (kW) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_1 -1956.11 17,159.95 
F1_Node006 SV01_Fdr1 -12.2931563 -100.5354233 
F1_Node008 GV02_Fdr1 -63.52609367 -203.7262137 
F1_Node010 SV02_Fdr1 40.83469625 -145.3485241 
F1_Node012 GV03_Fdr1 -100.6597467 -202.6535271 
F1_Node013 GV01_Fdr1 -353.5906447 -408.5199946 
F1_Node017 GV04_Fdr1 -250.2663023 -266.1251064 
F1_Node019 GV05_Fdr1 -36.16357632 -50.11910875 
F1_Node022 GV06_Fdr1 -79.3705088 -89.13195008 
F1_Node027 GV07_Fdr1 -5.170074807 -5.969628139 
F1_Node028 SV03_Fdr1 9.430122019 4.107769699 
F1_Node030 SV04_Fdr1 31.1155033 24.77053653 
F1_Node033 GV08_Fdr1 -203.4210756 -210.4550981 
F1_Node034 GV09_Fdr1 -406.2809647 -418.3581847 
F1_Node035 GV10_Fdr1 -191.3193559 -192.8985648 
F1_Node038 SV05_Fdr1 -7.369531616 -20.48501954 
F1_Node041 SV06_Fdr1 44.15261578 35.18718836 
F1_Node042 SV07_Fdr1 37.43325755 26.59135832 
F1_Node045 GV11_Fdr1 -213.7724107 -216.3592107 
F1_Node046 GV20_Fdr1 -22.50455267 -27.05623718 
F1_Node050 GV12_Fdr1 -29.00505017 -35.28450435 
F1_Node053 GV49_Fdr1 -54.03014731 -65.83461504 
F1_Node055 SV10_Fdr1 -32.95988777 -40.85739931 
F1_Node057 SV11_Fdr1 -8.034370768 -15.92610799 
F1_Node058 GV13_Fdr1 -50.65982542 -57.65326605 










A2. Calculations with 90% PV Penetration 
 
 
A2.1 90% PV Penetration without Fault 
o I1 = -3.2313851 - j2.2010854 
o ∑ Igrid_n = -3.2179942-j1.4554658 
o ∑ Ispot_n = -0.0133911-j0.7456192 
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n  = -3.2313854-j2.2010851 
 
o P1 = -3,231.39 kW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -3,219.52 kW 
o ∑ Pspot_n = 14.49 kW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n + ∑ Pspot_n  = -3234.00 kW 
 
 
A2.2 90% PV Penetration without Fault 
o I1 = 15.8854247 - j1.9354059 
o ∑ Igrid_n = -3.6130806 - j1.2187094 
o ∑ Ispot_n = -0.3497503-j0.5407927 
o ∑ Igrid_n + ∑ Ispot_n  = -3.9628309-j1.7595021 
 
o P1 = -1,5885.42 kW 
o ∑ Pgrid_n = -3,608.79 kW 
o ∑ Pspot_n = 349.25 kW 










Table A.3—Current calculations for simulation with 90% PV penetration 
From Node  To Node Current (pu) without fault Current (pu) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_1 -3.231-2.201i 15.885-1.935i 
F1_Node006 SV01_Fdr1 -0.018 -0.107+0.064i 
F1_Node008 GV02_Fdr1 -0.105-0.064i -0.246+0.046i 
F1_Node010 SV02_Fdr1 0.024-0.17i -0.163-0.044i 
F1_Node012 GV03_Fdr1 -0.161-0.079i -0.264-0.013i 
F1_Node013 GV01_Fdr1 -0.548-0.1i -0.605-0.062i 
F1_Node017 GV04_Fdr1 -0.391-0.145i -0.407-0.14i 
F1_Node019 GV05_Fdr1 -0.06-0.043i -0.074-0.039i 
F1_Node022 GV06_Fdr1 -0.125-0.067i -0.135-0.063i 
F1_Node027 GV07_Fdr1 -0.013-0.028i -0.014-0.029i 
F1_Node028 SV03_Fdr1 0.003-0.06i -0.003-0.059i 
F1_Node030 SV04_Fdr1 0.023-0.108i 0.017-0.106i 
F1_Node033 GV08_Fdr1 -0.305-0.07i -0.312-0.068i 
F1_Node034 GV09_Fdr1 -0.591-0.33i -0.603-0.327i 
F1_Node035 GV10_Fdr1 -0.316-0.202i -0.317-0.202i 
F1_Node038 SV05_Fdr1 -0.027-0.073i -0.04-0.069i 
F1_Node041 SV06_Fdr1 0.041-0.109i 0.032-0.106i 
F1_Node042 SV07_Fdr1 0.029-0.12i 0.018-0.117i 
F1_Node045 GV11_Fdr1 -0.33-0.096i -0.333-0.096i 
F1_Node046 GV20_Fdr1 -0.035-0.013i -0.039-0.014i 
F1_Node050 GV12_Fdr1 -0.048-0.027i -0.054-0.025i 
F1_Node053 GV49_Fdr1 -0.101-0.12i -0.113-0.118i 
F1_Node055 SV10_Fdr1 -0.063-0.068i -0.071-0.066i 
F1_Node057 SV11_Fdr1 -0.025-0.039i -0.033-0.038i 
F1_Node058 GV13_Fdr1 -0.089-0.072i -0.096-0.071i 












Table A.4—Power flows for simulation with 90% PV penetration 
From Node  To Node Real power flow (kW) without fault Real power flow (kW) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_1 -3231.39 15,885.42 
F1_Node006 SV01_Fdr1 -18.44358978 -106.6785733 
F1_Node008 GV02_Fdr1 -104.8973132 -244.75598 
F1_Node010 SV02_Fdr1 24.06725323 -162.082662 
F1_Node012 GV03_Fdr1 -161.4335793 -263.1239065 
F1_Node013 GV01_Fdr1 -548.2762286 -602.8893447 
F1_Node017 GV04_Fdr1 -391.4825098 -407.3143925 
F1_Node019 GV05_Fdr1 -60.03315505 -73.98539762 
F1_Node022 GV06_Fdr1 -125.053579 -134.8040087 
F1_Node027 GV07_Fdr1 -12.74666164 -13.54441857 
F1_Node028 SV03_Fdr1 2.40080082 -2.922836599 
F1_Node030 SV04_Fdr1 22.90622207 16.56187161 
F1_Node033 GV08_Fdr1 -304.7559812 -311.7720982 
F1_Node034 GV09_Fdr1 -591.7259908 -603.7323814 
F1_Node035 GV10_Fdr1 -315.7347308 -317.2899393 
F1_Node038 SV05_Fdr1 -27.03998735 -40.15489881 
F1_Node041 SV06_Fdr1 40.92356279 31.95861702 
F1_Node042 SV07_Fdr1 28.9986259 18.15615969 
F1_Node045 GV11_Fdr1 -330.3909848 -332.971727 
F1_Node046 GV20_Fdr1 -34.92413582 -39.47870339 
F1_Node050 GV12_Fdr1 -48.19626102 -54.4752305 
F1_Node053 GV49_Fdr1 -101.1725659 -112.9726132 
F1_Node055 SV10_Fdr1 -63.54907375 -71.44639281 
F1_Node057 SV11_Fdr1 -24.75098129 -32.64604433 
F1_Node058 GV13_Fdr1 -88.69161373 -95.68433422 











APPENDIX B – CASE STUDIES FOR FEEDERS 2-7: 30% PV PENETRATION 
 




















Table B.1—Current calculations for Feeder network 2 simulation (30% PV) 
From Node  To Node Current (pu) without fault Current (pu) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_2 -1.003-1.96i 13.874-0.099i 
F2_Node005 SV12_Fdr2 0.047-0.094i 0.024-0.088i 
F2_Node006 GV14_Fdr2 -0.238-0.066i -0.252-0.064i 
F2_Node008 SV13_Fdr2 0.069-0.158i 0.056-0.155i 
F2_Node010 GV15_Fdr2 -0.055-0.164i -0.062-0.169i 
F2_Node012 SV14_Fdr2 0.004+0.002i -0.042+0.023i 
F2_Node014 SV15_Fdr2 0.027-0.053i -0.009-0.035i 
F2_Node016 SV16_Fdr2 0.004 -0.045+0.026i 
F2_Node017 GV01_Fdr2 -0.148-0.089i -0.205-0.062i 
F2_Node019 SV01_Fdr2 0.006+0.003i -0.071+0.038i 
F2_Node020 SV02_Fdr2 0.075-0.17i -0.07-0.11i 
F2_Node023 GV16_Fdr2 -0.096-0.142i -0.23-0.081i 
F2_Node026 SV17_Fdr2 0.026-0.089i -0.189+0.022i 
F2_Node029 SV11_Fdr2 0.045-0.063i -0.278+0.109i 
F2_Node030 GV17_Fdr2 -0.062-0.187i -0.506+0.021i 
F2_Node033 SV19_Fdr2 0.052-0.14i -0.314+0.053i 
F2_Node035 GV18_Fdr2 -0.067-0.116i -0.371+0.027i 
F2_Node037 SV18_Fdr2 0.092-0.171i -0.276+0.007i 
F2_Node039 SV20_Fdr2 0.041-0.065i -0.35+0.148i 
F2_Node042 GV19_Fdr2 -0.135-0.091i -0.76+0.232i 
F2_Node044 SV26_Fdr2 0 0 
F2_Node046 SV21_Fdr2 0.033-0.016i -0.927+0.549i 
F2_Node048 GV21_Fdr2 -0.722-0.092i -0.87-0.055i 














Table B.2—Power flows for Feeder network 2 simulation (30% PV) 
From Node  To Node Real power flow (kW) without fault Real power flow (kW) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_2 -1003.409 13873.59 
F2_Node005 SV12_Fdr2 46.9915087369 24.5002347165 
F2_Node006 GV14_Fdr2 -238.0572710302 -251.8279345384 
F2_Node008 SV13_Fdr2 68.5507427217 55.8410135113 
F2_Node010 GV15_Fdr2 -55.0810397057 -62.2265350356 
F2_Node012 SV14_Fdr2 4.1136670377 -41.9734353496 
F2_Node014 SV15_Fdr2 26.4841356374 -9.1543607712 
F2_Node016 SV16_Fdr2 4.2391135137 -45.4513768846 
F2_Node017 GV01_Fdr2 -148.3894727149 -203.9116061025 
F2_Node019 SV01_Fdr2 6.2360840847 -71.2265415709 
F2_Node020 SV02_Fdr2 74.4915790677 -69.0443289688 
F2_Node023 GV16_Fdr2 -95.8090730692 -228.1056054424 
F2_Node026 SV17_Fdr2 25.9494889951 -187.8836362632 
F2_Node029 SV11_Fdr2 45.0737630907 -277.3420139980 
F2_Node030 GV17_Fdr2 -62.3770168914 -501.1047166145 
F2_Node033 SV19_Fdr2 51.5695568589 -310.8381726725 
F2_Node035 GV18_Fdr2 -67.6141570735 -367.4535530262 
F2_Node037 SV18_Fdr2 91.4689646289 -272.6111719492 
F2_Node039 SV20_Fdr2 41.0751467594 -348.4072234609 
F2_Node042 GV19_Fdr2 -135.4298266076 -752.9299271241 
F2_Node044 SV26_Fdr2 0.0000000003 -0.0000000075 
F2_Node046 SV21_Fdr2 32.5929868415 -923.9694899076 
F2_Node048 GV21_Fdr2 -721.4822576823 -852.3367783405 



































Table B.3—Current calculations for Feeder network 3 simulation (30% PV) 
From Node  To Node Current (pu) without fault Current (pu) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_3 -0.572-1.635i 14.934-0.448i 
F3_Node003 SV12_Fdr3 0.042-0.095i 0.025-0.09i 
F3_Node005 GV22_Fdr3 -0.082-0.109i -0.095-0.105i 
F3_Node006 SV14_Fdr3 -0.004-0.002i -0.016+0.001i 
F3_Node008 GV23_Fdr3 -0.159-0.038i -0.172-0.034i 
F3_Node011 GV24_Fdr3 0.009-0.053i -0.038-0.04i 
F3_Node012 SV22_Fdr3 0.044-0.097i -0.005-0.083i 
F3_Node015 SV23_Fdr3 0.024-0.053i -0.088-0.017i 
F3_Node018 SV24_Fdr3 0.029-0.062i -0.106-0.019i 
F3_Node020 GV25_Fdr3 -0.013-0.099i -0.156-0.068i 
F3_Node022 SV25_Fdr3 0 0 
F3_Node025 GV26_Fdr3 0.008-0.049i -0.133-0.012i 
F3_Node028 GV27_Fdr3 -0.006-0.15i -0.207-0.107i 
F3_Node031 SV21_Fdr3 -0.031+0.005i -0.322+0.066i 
F3_Node033 GV28_Fdr3 -0.107-0.084i -0.181-0.085i 
F3_Node035 SV18_Fdr3 0.062-0.165i -0.12-0.122i 
F3_Node038 GV29_Fdr3 -0.178-0.051i -0.302-0.03i 
F3_Node040 SV26_Fdr3 0 0 
F3_Node042 SV05_Fdr3 0.022-0.079i -0.43+0.125i 
F3_Node044 SV27_Fdr3 0.021-0.111i -0.326+0.054i 
F3_Node046 GV30_Fdr3 -0.079-0.105i -0.373+0.028i 
F3_Node049 GV31_Fdr3 -0.027-0.039i -0.349+0.115i 
F3_Node052 GV32_Fdr3 -0.076-0.033i -0.386+0.104i 
F3_Node054 SV28_Fdr3 0.035-0.102i -0.468+0.137i 
F3_Node056 GV33_Fdr3 -0.103-0.066i -0.57+0.137i 
















Table B.4—Power flows for Feeder network 3 simulation (30% PV) 
From Node  To Node Real power flow (kW) without fault Real power flow (kW) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_3 -571.62 14933.56 
F3_Node003 SV12_Fdr3 41.5036694689 25.1684049558 
F3_Node005 GV22_Fdr3 -82.2240140727 -94.8017786993 
F3_Node006 SV14_Fdr3 -4.1136686210 -15.9383872181 
F3_Node008 GV23_Fdr3 -158.8394372013 -171.8052949481 
F3_Node011 GV24_Fdr3 9.1620622564 -37.5135990756 
F3_Node012 SV22_Fdr3 43.4790489461 -4.7688337820 
F3_Node015 SV23_Fdr3 23.7213242858 -87.5775508753 
F3_Node018 SV24_Fdr3 28.8549632394 -105.3353287216 
F3_Node020 GV25_Fdr3 -12.8298078917 -154.3873390567 
F3_Node022 SV25_Fdr3 0.0000002468 -0.0000033443 
F3_Node025 GV26_Fdr3 7.8438623515 -132.7000285041 
F3_Node028 GV27_Fdr3 -6.4092265820 -205.2705498625 
F3_Node031 SV21_Fdr3 -30.6454688856 -321.2138634418 
F3_Node033 GV28_Fdr3 -106.8552038129 -179.9847927300 
F3_Node035 SV18_Fdr3 61.5647963415 -118.6459345977 
F3_Node038 GV29_Fdr3 -177.9590855487 -300.2989326299 
F3_Node040 SV26_Fdr3 0.0000025822 0.0000122458 
F3_Node042 SV05_Fdr3 21.6562796441 -428.3485126891 
F3_Node044 SV27_Fdr3 20.5037234662 -323.4436046910 
F3_Node046 GV30_Fdr3 -79.4823365279 -369.2496629802 
F3_Node049 GV31_Fdr3 -27.0388130535 -347.3216146090 
F3_Node052 GV32_Fdr3 -76.0919029461 -383.2301472166 
F3_Node054 SV28_Fdr3 35.0530260567 -464.9185622156 
F3_Node056 GV33_Fdr3 -103.3203395017 -565.6188574061 











































Table B.5—Current calculations for Feeder network 4 simulation (30% PV) 
From Node  To Node Current (pu) without fault Current (pu) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_4 -0.459-1.721i 16.227-1.088i 
F4_Node003 SV12_Fdr4 0.041-0.095i 0.022-0.088i 
F4_Node005 GV23_Fdr4 -0.159-0.037i -0.174-0.032i 
F4_Node008 SV22_Fdr4 0.044-0.095i -0.009-0.076i 
F4_Node010 GV34_Fdr4 0.016-0.064i -0.051-0.042i 
F4_Node011 SV29_Fdr4 0.05-0.112i 0.011-0.097i 
F4_Node014 SV23_Fdr4 0.024-0.052i -0.1 
F4_Node016 GV35_Fdr4 -0.061-0.149i -0.228-0.076i 
F4_Node019 GV26_Fdr4 0.001-0.053i -0.163+0.017i 
F4_Node021 SV24_Fdr4 0.028-0.062i -0.209+0.073i 
F4_Node023 GV36_Fdr4 -0.001-0.092i -0.115-0.068i 
F4_Node025 GV37_Fdr4 0.003-0.095i -0.282+0.057i 
F4_Node028 SV06_Fdr4 0.053-0.111i -0.101-0.056i 
F4_Node033 GV17_Fdr4 -0.091-0.175i -0.289-0.12i 
F4_Node035 GV12_Fdr4 0.001-0.021i -0.104+0.011i 
F4_Node037 SV30_Fdr4 0.025-0.052i -0.11-0.012i 
F4_Node042 GV19_Fdr4 -0.163-0.072i -0.316-0.045i 
F4_Node044 SV28_Fdr4 0.056-0.098i -0.097-0.067i 
F4_Node045 GV32_Fdr4 -0.063-0.031i -0.159-0.014i 
F4_Node049 SV31_Fdr4 0.02-0.019i -0.139+0.016i 
F4_Node051 GV39_Fdr4 0.01-0.094i -0.088-0.076i 
F4_Node053 SV32_Fdr4 0.009-0.007i -0.115+0.019i 
F4_Node056 GV29_Fdr4 -0.162-0.047i -0.249-0.033i 
F4_Node057 SV21_Fdr4 -0.002+0.01i -0.204+0.045i 
F4_Node058 GV38_Fdr4 -0.139-0.102i -0.275-0.077i 












Table B.6—Power flows for Feeder network 4 simulation (30% PV) 
From Node  To Node Real power flow (kW) without fault Real power flow (kW) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_4 -458.76 16226.99 
F4_Node003 SV12_Fdr4 41.1576145494 22.0672252064 
F4_Node005 GV23_Fdr4 -158.7421797593 -174.1033722098 
F4_Node008 SV22_Fdr4 43.8808044727 -9.0913574522 
F4_Node010 GV34_Fdr4 16.0979391065 -50.6350260173 
F4_Node011 SV29_Fdr4 50.3757840538 10.9508975858 
F4_Node014 SV23_Fdr4 23.9167556600 -99.0855332589 
F4_Node016 GV35_Fdr4 -61.5336911290 -225.7634048178 
F4_Node019 GV26_Fdr4 0.7592072975 -162.6326551125 
F4_Node021 SV24_Fdr4 27.8152756172 -207.5877918699 
F4_Node023 GV36_Fdr4 -0.8418298080 -112.3665599298 
F4_Node025 GV37_Fdr4 3.1903935237 -280.0205512709 
F4_Node028 SV06_Fdr4 52.3971587514 -100.1330432467 
F4_Node033 GV17_Fdr4 -90.9488338436 -286.8488121985 
F4_Node035 GV12_Fdr4 1.2420263732 -103.5770159469 
F4_Node037 SV30_Fdr4 25.0224966845 -109.8803464368 
F4_Node042 GV19_Fdr4 -162.8197583321 -314.6475425957 
F4_Node044 SV28_Fdr4 56.1901663589 -96.5749914285 
F4_Node045 GV32_Fdr4 -63.4710825083 -158.6387712127 
F4_Node049 SV31_Fdr4 20.0514029239 -138.2795282718 
F4_Node051 GV39_Fdr4 9.7548928435 -87.8881410709 
F4_Node053 SV32_Fdr4 8.9180630638 -115.1363887657 
F4_Node056 GV29_Fdr4 -161.6893598582 -247.8725240128 
F4_Node057 SV21_Fdr4 -1.9475141454 -203.7451387204 
F4_Node058 GV38_Fdr4 -138.5412088465 -274.0900009976 





























Table B.7—Current calculations for Feeder network 5 simulation (30% PV) 
From Node  To Node Current (pu) without fault Current (pu) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_5 -0.5-1.509i 10.881+0.13i 
F5_Node004 SV12_Fdr5 0 0 
F5_Node005 SV33_Fdr5 0 0 
F5_Node009 SV34_Fdr5 0.027-0.019i -0.135+0.024i 
F5_Node011 GV15_Fdr5 -0.027-0.132i -0.211-0.09i 
F5_Node013 GV37_Fdr5 0.01-0.09i -0.125-0.06i 
F5_Node015 SV04_Fdr5 0.053-0.093i -0.102-0.055i 
F5_Node017 GV08_Fdr5 -0.084-0.012i -0.258+0.027i 
F5_Node019 GV40_Fdr5 -0.065-0.16i -0.412-0.071i 
F5_Node022 GV41_Fdr5 -0.071-0.041i -0.472+0.061i 
F5_Node025 GV42_Fdr5 -0.034-0.134i -0.172-0.142i 
F5_Node026 SV35_Fdr5 0 0 
F5_Node029 GV50_Fdr5 -0.193-0.152i -0.269-0.157i 
F5_Node031 SV05_Fdr5 0.065-0.034i -0.592+0.143i 
F5_Node033 SV27_Fdr5 0.061-0.066i -0.399+0.055i 
F5_Node036 SV19_Fdr5 0.055-0.093i -0.422+0.03i 
F5_Node038 GV18_Fdr5 -0.065-0.083i -0.444 
F5_Node042 GV38_Fdr5 -0.121-0.062i -0.649+0.063i 
F5_Node043 SV31_Fdr5 0 0 
F5_Node049 GV49_Fdr5 0.046-0.069i -0.933+0.357i 
F5_Node051 GV33_Fdr5 -0.067-0.022i -0.827+0.27i 
F5_Node056 GV43_Fdr5 -0.132-0.073i -0.678+0.062i 
F5_Node060 SV10_Fdr5 0.049-0.028i -0.442+0.097i 
F5_Node061 GV13_Fdr5 0.034-0.05i -0.456+0.047i 
F5_Node064 SV17_Fdr5 0.038-0.05i -0.312+0.041i 
F5_Node066 GV44_Fdr5 -0.078-0.047i -0.459+0.048i 















Table B.8—Power flows for Feeder network 5 simulation (30% PV) 
From Node  To Node Real power flow (kW) without fault Real power flow (kW) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_5 -499.62 10881.06 
F5_Node004 SV12_Fdr5 0.0000000003 -0.0000000006 
F5_Node005 SV33_Fdr5 0.0000000000 -0.0000000009 
F5_Node009 SV34_Fdr5 26.5181324124 -134.7090505537 
F5_Node011 GV15_Fdr5 -27.2588510153 -209.6500923437 
F5_Node013 GV37_Fdr5 10.1949544022 -124.4854134158 
F5_Node015 SV04_Fdr5 52.6842121325 -101.0766827905 
F5_Node017 GV08_Fdr5 -84.1916104494 -256.6540233321 
F5_Node019 GV40_Fdr5 -64.8246743228 -407.5744723133 
F5_Node022 GV41_Fdr5 -70.8239257444 -469.2747381793 
F5_Node025 GV42_Fdr5 -34.1278363521 -168.1818847510 
F5_Node026 SV35_Fdr5 0.0000000005 -0.0000000048 
F5_Node029 GV50_Fdr5 -193.2788434728 -263.1916866604 
F5_Node031 SV05_Fdr5 64.6997775712 -589.8279137178 
F5_Node033 SV27_Fdr5 60.4084341918 -396.8434214542 
F5_Node036 SV19_Fdr5 54.7021313233 -418.6762461416 
F5_Node038 GV18_Fdr5 -65.1862620036 -440.1891997334 
F5_Node042 GV38_Fdr5 -120.5266627715 -644.2365207307 
F5_Node043 SV31_Fdr5 0.0000000002 -0.0000000065 
F5_Node049 GV49_Fdr5 45.6009186687 -928.3855645005 
F5_Node051 GV33_Fdr5 -66.6197264715 -820.5163473702 
F5_Node056 GV43_Fdr5 -131.3866201358 -672.6775910582 
F5_Node060 SV10_Fdr5 48.8075983400 -439.5759515042 
F5_Node061 GV13_Fdr5 33.9847313019 -452.5774221458 
F5_Node064 SV17_Fdr5 37.4420370306 -310.1316316634 
F5_Node066 GV44_Fdr5 -78.0212334445 -455.5930479608 




































Table B.9—Current calculations for Feeder network 6 simulation (30% PV) 
From Node  To Node Current (pu) without fault Current (pu) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_6 -0.74-1.845i 14.279-0.776i 
F6_Node004 SV15_Fdr6 0.022-0.053i 0.004-0.047i 
F6_Node006 SV16_Fdr6 -0.003-0.002i -0.022+0.004i 
F6_Node008 GV02_Fdr6 -0.021-0.048i -0.04-0.042i 
F6_Node012 GV04_Fdr6 -0.099-0.094i -0.139-0.082i 
F6_Node013 SV33_Fdr6 0 0 
F6_Node015 SV36_Fdr6 0.003-0.002i -0.029+0.007i 
F6_Node018 GV45_Fdr6 -0.136-0.075i -0.161-0.069i 
F6_Node020 SV34_Fdr6 0.004-0.048i -0.015-0.045i 
F6_Node022 GV06_Fdr6 -0.044-0.052i -0.062-0.052i 
F6_Node025 GV24_Fdr6 0.011-0.052i -0.032-0.038i 
F6_Node027 GV34_Fdr6 0.018-0.064i -0.04-0.046i 
F6_Node028 SV29_Fdr6 0.052-0.112i 0.013-0.1i 
F6_Node030 GV35_Fdr6 -0.057-0.147i -0.205-0.101i 
F6_Node034 SV05_Fdr6 0.024-0.077i -0.263+0.012i 
F6_Node036 GV46_Fdr6 -0.014-0.101i -0.167-0.064i 
F6_Node038 SV07_Fdr6 0.065-0.118i -0.175-0.049i 
F6_Node040 GV43_Fdr6 -0.174-0.116i -0.372-0.069i 
F6_Node043 SV30_Fdr6 0.02-0.046i -0.154-0.007i 
F6_Node045 SV20_Fdr6 0.01-0.048i -0.174-0.002i 
F6_Node046 GV49_Fdr6 0.009-0.106i -0.255-0.052i 
F6_Node048 GV41_Fdr6 -0.103-0.08i -0.424+0.027i 
F6_Node050 GV09_Fdr6 -0.179-0.094i -0.67+0.084i 
F6_Node053 GV47_Fdr6 -0.08-0.14i -0.597+0.068i 
F6_Node055 SV31_Fdr6 -0.001-0.024i -0.608+0.267i 
F6_Node057 GV48_Fdr6 -0.069-0.143i -0.78+0.192i 












Table B.10—Power flows for Feeder network 6 simulation (30% PV) 
From Node  To Node Real power flow (kW) without fault Real power flow (kW) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_6 -739.99 14278.85 
F6_Node004 SV15_Fdr6 22.0147462175 3.5964064463 
F6_Node006 SV16_Fdr6 -3.4752751561 -21.6418904175 
F6_Node008 GV02_Fdr6 -20.8673833336 -40.0673074749 
F6_Node012 GV04_Fdr6 -98.9925665155 -138.8696735551 
F6_Node013 SV33_Fdr6 0.0000000896 -0.0000003858 
F6_Node015 SV36_Fdr6 3.2141336317 -28.6541470625 
F6_Node018 GV45_Fdr6 -135.7652395062 -161.1574292782 
F6_Node020 SV34_Fdr6 4.2034698857 -14.8818565569 
F6_Node022 GV06_Fdr6 -44.0327696853 -62.3290326289 
F6_Node025 GV24_Fdr6 11.0064005395 -31.7081262164 
F6_Node027 GV34_Fdr6 18.3233687635 -40.0294668228 
F6_Node028 SV29_Fdr6 51.9085419627 13.5811638134 
F6_Node030 GV35_Fdr6 -56.6268569777 -202.8905917067 
F6_Node034 SV05_Fdr6 24.2202112083 -262.3559840883 
F6_Node036 GV46_Fdr6 -14.3938246112 -165.3214436206 
F6_Node038 SV07_Fdr6 64.6014535397 -173.5474941626 
F6_Node040 GV43_Fdr6 -173.4559638960 -369.5272181159 
F6_Node043 SV30_Fdr6 19.6248638339 -153.7513370707 
F6_Node045 SV20_Fdr6 10.1576575019 -172.9931572313 
F6_Node046 GV49_Fdr6 8.4706645596 -253.9137828758 
F6_Node048 GV41_Fdr6 -102.6058988702 -421.9165628224 
F6_Node050 GV09_Fdr6 -178.4872612474 -665.4439025203 
F6_Node053 GV47_Fdr6 -80.5536087790 -591.3606413972 
F6_Node055 SV31_Fdr6 -0.5921792407 -606.4324528625 
F6_Node057 GV48_Fdr6 -68.8297817243 -771.4942247476 





























Table B.11—Current calculations for Feeder network 7 simulation (30% PV) 
From Node  To Node Current (pu) without fault Current (pu) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_7 -0.526-1.92i 15.159-0.783i 
F7_Node003 GV22_Fdr7 -0.082-0.109i -0.095-0.104i 
F7_Node006 SV36_Fdr7 -0.001-0.003i -0.034+0.007i 
F7_Node008 GV45_Fdr7 -0.139-0.076i -0.166-0.068i 
F7_Node011 GV05_Fdr7 -0.01-0.024i -0.086-0.001i 
F7_Node012 SV13_Fdr7 0.072-0.151i 0.016-0.131i 
F7_Node016 GV46_Fdr7 -0.018-0.098i -0.188-0.047i 
F7_Node019 GV16_Fdr7 -0.095-0.123i -0.256-0.072i 
F7_Node022 SV02_Fdr7 0.089-0.137i -0.203-0.04i 
F7_Node024 GV03_Fdr7 -0.016-0.038i -0.177+0.012i 
F7_Node026 GV20_Fdr7 -0.002-0.002i -0.155+0.047i 
F7_Node028 GV44_Fdr7 -0.109-0.074i -0.263-0.03i 
F7_Node031 GV40_Fdr7 -0.085-0.17i -0.369-0.061i 
F7_Node033 SV35_Fdr7 0.063-0.138i 0.061-0.139i 
F7_Node035 SV03_Fdr7 0.032-0.041i -0.162+0.038i 
F7_Node037 GV25_Fdr7 0.008-0.066i -0.188-0.009i 
F7_Node038 SV15_Fdr7 0 0 
F7_Node042 GV30_Fdr7 -0.074-0.093i -0.285-0.018i 
F7_Node044 GV31_Fdr7 -0.022-0.027i -0.226+0.044i 
F7_Node046 GV49_Fdr7 0.014-0.097i -0.386+0.05i 
F7_Node048 GV48_Fdr7 -0.067-0.125i -0.379-0.03i 
F7_Node050 GV39_Fdr7 -0.003-0.086i -0.208-0.015i 
F7_Node052 GV47_Fdr7 -0.079-0.123i -0.388-0.019i 
F7_Node054 SV32_Fdr7 -0.009+0.007i -0.271+0.101i 
F7_Node056 SV21_Fdr7 0 0 
F7_Node058 GV27_Fdr7 0.006-0.127i -0.284-0.032i 











Table B.12—Power flows for Feeder network 7 simulation (30% PV) 
From Node  To Node Real power flow (kW) without fault Real power flow (kW) with fault 
Main substation Fdr_7 -526.32 15158.57 
F7_Node003 GV22_Fdr7 -82.3724065921 -94.6956051689 
F7_Node006 SV36_Fdr7 -0.8240722683 -33.5462843794 
F7_Node008 GV45_Fdr7 -138.9624292609 -165.8179625283 
F7_Node011 GV05_Fdr7 -9.7606930103 -86.0371442733 
F7_Node012 SV13_Fdr7 72.0070133255 16.1075485099 
F7_Node016 GV46_Fdr7 -17.6831284371 -186.6211390294 
F7_Node019 GV16_Fdr7 -95.1374170917 -254.3296621785 
F7_Node022 SV02_Fdr7 89.0526469249 -201.6715710494 
F7_Node024 GV03_Fdr7 -16.2728438930 -175.8331147917 
F7_Node026 GV20_Fdr7 -2.1597715371 -154.4510389362 
F7_Node028 GV44_Fdr7 -108.4660032585 -260.9786118229 
F7_Node031 GV40_Fdr7 -84.7187437375 -365.3018980944 
F7_Node033 SV35_Fdr7 62.7571198163 62.7570254786 
F7_Node035 SV03_Fdr7 31.4251247765 -161.7438276520 
F7_Node037 GV25_Fdr7 8.2607731358 -187.1451829135 
F7_Node038 SV15_Fdr7 0.0000000002 -0.0000000033 
F7_Node042 GV30_Fdr7 -74.1980812190 -282.8151616231 
F7_Node044 GV31_Fdr7 -22.1002356107 -224.9538343524 
F7_Node046 GV49_Fdr7 14.0128853547 -384.1501199626 
F7_Node048 GV48_Fdr7 -66.6749270560 -376.2521775972 
F7_Node050 GV39_Fdr7 -3.3714805706 -206.5068309396 
F7_Node052 GV47_Fdr7 -79.1987678862 -384.7101404376 
F7_Node054 SV32_Fdr7 -8.9180439369 -270.0085060440 
F7_Node056 SV21_Fdr7 -0.0000000001 -0.0000000039 
F7_Node058 GV27_Fdr7 5.6333584141 -281.7235401924 












APPENDIX C – VOLTAGE LIMITS 
 
The steady state voltage is the voltage a Customer can expect to receive under normal operating 
conditions.  Since the loads on a utility system are constantly changing, it is impossible to 
maintain a completely constant voltage.  Thus the Company will provide voltage regulation to 
keep the steady state voltage within the ranges shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 as indicated by ANSI 
standard C84.1. 
 
Table C.1—ANSI C84.1 Voltage Limits (Service Voltage) 
Service Voltage (1) Range A (2)(4) Range B (2)(6) 
Maximum +5% +5.83% 
Minimum  -5% -8.33% 
 
1. Service voltage is measured at the point of common coupling between Customer and 
Company. Jurisdictional Public Service Commissions may specify other voltage 
limits.  
 
Table C.2—ANSI C84.1 Voltage Limits (Utilization Voltage) 
Utilization Voltage (6) Range A (2)(4) Range B (2)(6) 
Maximum (equipment rated >600 V) +5% +5.83% 
Maximum (equipment rated <600 V) +4.17% +5.83% 
Minimum -8.33%(-10% (3)) -11.67%(-13.33%(3)) 
 
2. Voltage limits in % deviation from nominal 
3. For circuits with no lighting equipment  
4. Range A applies to normal operations  
5. Range B applies for short duration and/or abnormal conditions on the utility system 
(excluding fault conditions and transients).  
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